Buffalo Law Review
Volume 49

Number 3

Article 3

10-1-2001

Restricting Prisoners' Equal Access to the Federal Courts: The
Three Strikes Provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act and
Substantive Equal Protection
Randal S. Jeffrey
New York Legal Assistance Group

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Randal S. Jeffrey, Restricting Prisoners' Equal Access to the Federal Courts: The Three Strikes Provision
of the Prison Litigation Reform Act and Substantive Equal Protection, 49 Buff. L. Rev. 1099 (2001).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol49/iss3/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ University at
Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact lawscholar@buffalo.edu.

Restricting Prisoners' Equal Access to the
Federal Courts:
The Three Strikes Provision of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act
and Substantive Equal Protection
RANDAL S. JEFFREYt
INTRODUCTION

On April 26, 1996, President Clinton signed into law
the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PLRA" or "the
Act").' As part of a broader legislative effort in recent years
to weaken judicial enforcement of certain federal rights, the
PLRA substantially restricts prisoner litigation, both classaction conditions of confinement suits and individual civil
suits.2 One of these restrictions, which is commonly known
t Staff Attorney, Special Litigation Unit of the New York Legal Assistance
Group. J.D., Columbia University School of Law, 1994. 1 would like to thank the
editors and staff of the Buffalo Law Review for their work in publishing this
article. I would also like to thank Kerry McArthur for her continued support
during the writing of this article.
1. Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996). The reference to the year 1995
in the title of the PLRA is an error. The Sixth Circuit has described this error as
one of several drafting problems with the PLRA: "The statute contains
typographical errors; creates conflicts with the Rules of Appellate Procedure;
and is internally inconsistent. Moreover, the year in its name, 1995, does not
correspond to the date of enactment, 1996. We have even issued an
unprecedented administrative order in an attempt to organize the chaos."
McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 603 (6th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted).
Consideration of the constitutionality of the three strikes provision, however, is
not affected by any drafting problems with other provisions of the Act.
2. Most notably, the PLRA: (1) restricts prison "conditions of confinement"
litigation, PLRA § 802 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (1994 & Supp. III 1997)); (2)
limits attorney's fees for successful cases, see id. § 803(d) (adding 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(d) (Supp. II 1996)); (3) requires a physical injury for a prisoner to recover
damages for mental or emotional injury suffered while incarcerated, see id.
(amending 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (Supp. II 1996)); (4) requires indigent prisoners
to pay the filing fees in civil cases in installments, see id. § 804(a) (adding a new
28 U.S.C. § 1915(b) (Supp. II 1996)); (5) requires courts to screen prisoner civil
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actions for frivolousness, maliciousness, or failure to state a claim, see id. §
805(a) (adding a new 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (Supp. I 1996)); and (6) authorizes the
revocation of good time credits if a court finds that a prisoner has brought a
claim maliciously or solely to harass a party or presented false testimony in
pursuing a claim, see id. § 809(a) (adding a new 28 U.S.C. § 1932 (Supp. II
1996)).
Like the three strikes provision analyzed in this article, these other
provisions of the PLRA also have been subject to constitutional challenges.
Courts have adjudicated the constitutionality of: (1) the provision that permits
courts to immediately terminate prison condition consent decrees, see Ruiz v.
United States, 243 F.3d 941, 945-50 (5th Cir. 2001) (upholding this provision
against separation of powers and due process challenges); Tyler v. Murphy, 135
F.3d 594, 597 (8th Cir. 1998) (upholding the provision against the argument
that it deprives courts of their authority to remedy constitutional violations);
Gavin v. Branstad, 122 F.3d 1081, 1085-92 (8th Cir. 1997) (upholding the
provision against separation of powers, due process, and equal protection
challenges); (2) the provision that limits attorney's fees, see Hadix v. Johnson,
230 F.3d 840, 842-47 (6th Cir. 2000) (upholding this provision against an equal
protection challenge); Boivin v. Black, 225 F.3d 36, 41-46 (1st Cir. 2000) (same);
Madrid v. Gomez, 190 F.3d 990, 996 (9th Cir. 1999) (same); (3) the provision
requiring physical injury, see Searles v. Van Bebber, 251 F.3d 869, 876-77 (10th
Cir. 2001) (upholding this provision against a due process challenge); Davis v.
District of Columbia, 158 F.3d 1342, 1345-48 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (upholding this
provision against equal protection and access to the courts challenges); Zehner
v. Trigg, 133 F.3d 459, 463-64 (7th Cir. 1997) (upholding this provision against
equal protection and separation of powers challenges); and (4) the provision
that requires prisoners proceeding in forma pauperis to pay the filing fee in
installments, see Tucker v. Branker, 142 F.3d 1294, 1297-1301 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(upholding this provision against due process, access to the courts, and equal
protection challenges); Norton v. Dimazana, 122 F.3d 286, 289-91 (5th Cir.
1997) (upholding this provision against an access to the courts challenge);
Nicholas v. Tucker, 114 F.3d 17, 19-21 (2d Cir. 1997) (upholding this provision
against equal protection and access to the courts challenges); Mitchell v.
Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1487-89 (11th Cir. 1997) (upholding this provision
against an equal protection challenge); Roller v. Gunn, 107 F.3d 227, 231-34
(4th Cir. 1997) (upholding this provision against access to the courts and equal
protection challenges); Hampton v. Hobbs, 106 F.3d 1281, 1284-89 (6th Cir.
1997) (upholding this provision against access to the court, First Amendment,
equal protection, due process, and double jeopardy challenges).
For discussions of the constitutionality of these provisions of the PLRA, see
Joseph T. Lukens, The Prison LitigationReform Act: Three Strikes and You're
out of Court-It May Be Effective, But Is It Constitutional?,70 TEMP. L. REV.
471, 509-510 (1997) (arguing that the provision requiring prisoners proceeding
in forma pauperis to pay the filing fee in installments is constitutional); Jason
E. Pepe, Challenging Congress's Latest Attempt to Confine Prisoners'
ConstitutionalRights: Equal Protection and the Prison Litigation Reform Act,
23 HAMLNE L. REV. 58, 71-80 (1999) (arguing that the provision requiring
physical injury violates equal protection); James E. Robertson, Psychological
Injury and the PrisonLitigationReform Act: A "Not Exactly," Equal Protection
Analysis, 37 HARV. J. LEGIS. 105 (2000) (arguing that the provision requiring
physical injury violates equal protection); Peter Hobart, Comment, The Prison
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as the "three strikes provision," prohibits prisoners with
"three strikes" from taking advantage of the federal in
forma pauperis statute, which authorizes a waiver of the
fees for filing an action or appeal in federal court;' a
prisoner receives a strike each time a federal court
dismisses one of the prisoner's actions or appeals as
frivolous, as malicious, or for failure to state a claim.4
Applying the three strikes provision to prisoners who seek
to bring civil rights actions and appeals but who are unable
to afford the filing fees, by effectively denying such persons
equal access to the courts, raises serious constitutional
concerns.
This article considers the constitutionality of the three
strikes provision of the PLRA as applied to prisoners
seeking to file complaints and appeals in civil rights cases5
LitigationReform Act: Striking the Balance Between Law and Order,44 VILL. L.
REV. 981 (1999) (discussing the constitutionality of all of the provisions of the
PLRA); Eugene J. Kuzinski, Note, The End of the PrisonLaw Firm?: Frivolous
Inmate Litigation, Judicial Oversight, and the PrisonLitigation Reform Act of
1995, 29 RUTGERs L.J. 361, 376-87, 398 (1998) (discussing the various
provisions of the PLRA, and arguing that most of its provisions likely will be
found constitutional); Julie M. Riewe, Note, The Least Among Us:
Unconstitutional Changes in Prisoner Litigation Under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act of 1995, 47 DUKE L.J. 117, 125-43, 153-59 (1997) (arguing that the
provision requiring prisoners proceeding in forma pauperis to pay the filing fee
in installments and, under certain interpretations, the provision requiring
physical injury violate equal protection).
3. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
Subject to subsection (b), any court of the United States may authorize
the commencement, prosecution or defense of any suit, action or
proceeding, civil or criminal, or appeal therein, without prepayment of
fees or security thereof, by a person who submits an affidavit that
includes a statement of all assets such prisoner possesses that the
person is unable to pay such fees or give security therefor.
Id. While the PLRA amended § 1915(a) to refer to the submission of a statement
of the assets of a "prisoner," in forma pauperis remains available to all persons,
not just prisoners. See, e.g., Floyd v. U.S. Postal Serv., 105 F.3d 274, 275-76 (6th
Cir. 1997) (stating that "the only logical conclusion is that Congress intended to
use the phrase 'person possesses' [in § 1915(a)(1)] instead of 'prisoner
possesses'"). This particular mistake is indicative of the fact that the drafters of
the PLRA specifically targeted prisoners' access to the courts in amending the
in forma pauperis statute.
4. See PLRA § 804(d), 110 Stat. at 1374-75 (adding 42 U.S.C. § 1915(g)).
5. Since the three strikes provision concerns both the fee to file a civil rights
action in district court as well as the fee to file an appeal of a civil rights action
in the appropriate court of appeals, this article concerns both fees as well; this
article refers to these actions and appeals together as "cases." Given that one of
the two key Supreme Court cases relied on for concluding that the three strikes
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brought either by state prisoners pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983,6 or by federal prisoners pursuant to the federal
question jurisdiction of federal courts,7 who cannot afford
the filing fees. This article concludes that Supreme Court
precedent compels finding that this provision is
unconstitutional. In particular, the Court in Smith v.
Bennett8 held that the filing fee for a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus must be waivable for those who cannot afford
the fee.9 When read in conjunction with Wolff v.
provision is unconstitutional, namely Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961),
concerns a trial court filing fee, it could be argued that Smith is inapplicable to
appellate court fees in civil rights cases. However, as explained below, there is
no convincing basis for drawing such a distinction. See infra notes 162-65 and
accompanying text.
6. Section 1983 authorizes federal court cases for violations of federal rights
by state actors. It provides as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought
against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's
judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.
For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable
exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a
statute of the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
7. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388 (1971), the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs can bring actions for
damages against federal agents in federal court for constitutional violations, in
addition to suits for injunctive relief. See id. at 397-98; see also Davis v.
Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 236-44 (1979) (holding that the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment is directly enforceable under federal courts' general
federal question jurisdiction); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978)
("[Tihe decision in Bivens established that a citizen suffering a compensable
injury to a constitutionally protected interest could invoke the general federalquestion jurisdiction of the district courts to obtain an award of monetary
damages against the responsible federal official."). Thus, claims brought
pursuant to Bivens by federal prisoners are equivalent to § 1983 claims brought
by state prisoners. While one of the two key decisions that this article relies on
in concluding that the three strikes provision is unconstitutional, Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), is a § 1983 case, the reasoning in Wolff should
apply to civil rights claims brought by federal prisoners. See infra notes 174-75
and accompanying text.
8. 365 U.S. 708 (1961).
9. See id. at 709.
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McDonnell," in which the Court, in the access to courts
context, held that no reasoned distinction could be drawn
between habeas corpus and civil rights cases, it is clear that
the filing fee for a civil rights action must be waivable for
those unable to afford the fee."
Furthermore, this article argues that the three strikes
provision violates equal protection, specifically the right of
equal access to the courts. In reaching this conclusion, this
article first develops the concept of substantive equal
protection and then situates the right of equal access to the
courts within this concept. Recognizing this substantive
equal protection framework as one already established
under federal and state law, and viewing the right to equal
access within this framework, provides the right with a
more solid foundation. While such a perspective is not
essential for concluding that the three strikes provision is
unconstitutional, it is nonetheless important for
demonstrating why the provision is unconstitutional.
While this article concludes that the three strikes
provision is unconstitutional as applied to civil rights cases,
the seven circuit courts that have adjudicated the
constitutionality of the provision all have upheld the
provision against constitutional challenges. 2 In contrast to
these decisions, the limited commentary on the provision is
critical of its constitutionality. 3 This disagreement between
10. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
11. See id. at 579-80.
12. See infra Part III.
13. See Joshua D. Franklin, Comment, Three Strikes and You're out of
Constitutional Rights? The Prison Litigation Reform Act's "Three Strikes"
Provisionand Its Effect on Indigents, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 191, 193 (2000) ("This
comment argues that the so-called 'three strikes' provision is constitutionally
suspect in that it violates the equal protection component of the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause."); Lukens, supranote 2, at 472 ("This Article
argues that the 'three strikes' provision unconstitutionally burdens the affected
prisoners' fundamental right to have meaningful access to the federal courts to
challenge the conditions of their confinement."); Riewe, supra note 3, at 121
("This [three-strikes] provision.., similarly violates the fundamental right of
indigent prisoners to access the courts."); Simone Schonenberger, Note, Access
Denied. The PrisonLitigationReform Act, 86 KY. L.J. 457, 469-75 (1997). Prior
to the enactment of the PLRA, a number of commentators had argued for
restricting prisoners' access to the courts. See Gail L. Bakaitis DeWolf, Note,
Protectingthe Courts from the Barrage of Frivolous PrisonerLitigation:A Look
at Judicial Remedies and Ohio's Proposed Legislative Remedy, 57 OHIO ST. L.J.
257, 269 (1996) (arguing that "[a] solution [to the problem of abusive prisoner
litigation] is needed which offers broad coverage, uniformity in application, and
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the courts and commentators may simply reflect a more
liberal attitude on the part of commentators who, unlike the
courts, are not burdened by adjudicating prisoner civil
rights suits on a daily basis. However, it is more likely that
this disagreement reflects confusion over the nature of the
right of equal access to the courts and the failure of the
circuit courts to fully appreciate Supreme Court precedent
in this area. By providing a more in-depth analysis of the
right of equal access, this article seeks to clarify the basis
for this right in the process of demonstrating why the three
strikes provision is unconstitutional.
Before summarizing this article, it bears mention that
the three strikes provision raises a number of other issues
that this article does not discuss. These issues include
whether the provision should be applied to cases pending at
the time of the PLRA's enactment, 4 whether dismissals
that occurred prior to the Act's enactment should be
counted as strikes, 5 and whether courts should sua sponte
an effective result"); Michael J. Mueller, Note, Abusive Pro Se Plaintiffs in the
FederalCourts:Proposalsfor JudicialControl, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 93, 9697 (1984); Michael Noone McCarty, Note, Limitations of State Prisoners'Civil
Rights Suits in the Federal Courts, 27 CATH. U. L. REV. 115 (1977); Jody L.
Sturtz, Comment, A Prisoner'sPrivilege to File In Forma PauperisProceedings:
May It Be Numerically Restricted?, 1995 DETROIT C.L. MICH. ST. U. L. REV.

1349, 1368 (1995) ("The Federal In Forma Pauperis Statute should be amended
to limit the number of cases which persons in correctional facilities may file to
three per calendar year.") (footnote omitted); Mary Van Vort, Note, Controlling
and DeterringFrivolous In Forma PauperisComplaints, 55 FORDHAM L. REV.
1165, 1166-67 (1987) (arguing "that courts should adopt procedures for prefiling
review that facilitate the screening of IFP applications in addition to procedures
for assessing costs against IFP plaintiffs in order to reduce the number of
frivolous complaints initially presented to the court").
14. Compare Altizer v. Deeds, 191 F.3d 540, 545-47 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding
that the three strikes provision does not apply to actions pending when the
PLRA was enacted), and Garcia v. Silbert, 141 F.3d 1415, 1416-17 (10th Cir.
1998) (same), and Abdul-Wadood v. Nathan, 91 F.3d 1023, 1025 (7th Cir. 1996)
(same), with Adepegba v. Hammons, 103 F.3d 383, 387-88 (5th Cir. 1996)
(holding that the three strikes provision applies to cases pending when the
PLRA was enacted).
15. Compare Ibrahim v. District of Columbia, 208 F.3d 1032, 1036 (D.C. Cir.
2000) (holding that dismissals prior to the enactment of the PLRA count as
strikes), and Welch v. Galie, 207 F.3d 130, 132 (2d Cir. 2000) (per curiam)
(same), and Rivera v. Allin, 144 F.3d 719, 730 (11th Cir.) (same), cert.
dismissed, 524 U.S. 978 (1998), and Wilson v. Yaklich, 148 F.3d 596, 604 (6th
Cir. 1998) (same), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1139 (1999), and Patton v. Jefferson
Corr.Ctr., 136 F.3d 458, 462 (5th Cir. 1998) (same), and Tierney v. Kupers, 128
F.3d 1310, 1312 (9th Cir. 1997) (same), and Keener v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole,
128 F.3d 143, 144-45 (3d Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (same), and Green v.
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raise the three strikes provision or if instead defendants
should be required to plead this provision as an affirmative
defense.16 This article also does not consider challenges to
the three strikes provision outside of the access to the
courts context, such as separation of powers,' bill of
attainder, 8 and ex post facto challenges. 9
In addition, this article does not consider whether the
three strikes provision would survive rational basis equal
protection scrutiny. Such scrutiny generally is applied in an
equal protection challenge when the challenged state action
neither burdens a fundamental right nor makes a suspect
classification." All seven circuit courts that have addressed
the constitutionality of the three strikes provision have

Nottingham, 90 F.3d 415, 420 (10th Cir. 1996) (same), with Lukens, supra note
2, at 517-19 (arguing that the three strikes provision should not apply
retroactively, so that dismissals prior to the enactment of the PLRA should not
count as strikes).
16. On the one hand, requiring defendants to plead that a potential litigant
is barred by the three strikes provision would burden defendants. On the other
hand, requiring courts to sua sponte determine whether the provision applies to
a potential litigant would place a burden on the judiciary, a result that would
appear to conflict with one of the purposes of the provision, namely relieving the
burden that prisoner litigation places on the judiciary. See infra note 183 and
accompanying text. An alternative to these options would be to provide both
courts and defendants with the discretion to raise the three strikes provision.
While no circuit court has yet to explicitly address this issue, in practice, courts
routinely sua sponte raise the applicability of the three strikes provision.
Addressing a related issue, the Seventh Circuit has held that a district court, in
denying in forma pauperis on the ground that the prisoner had three strikes,
"must cite specifically the case names, case docket numbers, districts in which
the actions were filed, and the dates of the orders dismissing the actions."
Evans v. Ill. Dep't of Corr., 150 F.3d 810, 812 (7th Cir. 1998). This procedure
protects prisoners by providing the basis on which the court has reached its
conclusion that the three strikes provision applies, such that the prisoner can
challenge any erroneous information that might have led to the imposition of
the three strikes provision.
17. See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1181-82 (9th Cir. 1999)
(discussing and rejecting a separation of powers challenge to the three strikes
provision); Rivera, 144 F.3d at 725-26 (same); cf. infra note 46 (discussing
Justice Thomas's concurrence in Lewis v. Casey, in which he finds the right of
access to the courts in the separation of powers).
18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 ("No Bill of Attainder... shall be passed.");
see Wilson, 148 F.3d at 605-06 (discussing and rejecting a bill of attainder
challenge to the three strikes provision).
19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 ("No... ex post facto Law shall be passed.");
see Rodriguez, 169 F.3d at 1181 (discussing and rejecting an ex post facto
challenge to the three strikes provision); Wilson, 148 F.3d at 606 (same).
20. See, e.g., Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 799 (1997).
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subjected the three strikes provision to rational basis
scrutiny and held that the provision survives such
scrutiny.-1 This article, however, argues that, since the
three strikes provision burdens a fundamental right,
namely the right of equal access to the courts, it must be
subject to heightened scrutiny.22 Thus, this article need not
address the much more difficult question of whether the
three strikes provision would survive rational basis
scrutiny.23
This article also explores the three strikes provision
only as applied to civil rights cases by prisoners unable to
afford the full filing fee. While the three strikes provision

21. See Higgins v. Carpenter, 258 F.3d 797, 798 (8th Cir. 2001); AbdulAkbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 318-19 (3d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct.
2600 (2001); Rodriguez, 169 F.3d at 1180-81; White v. Colorado, 157 F.3d 1226,
1234-35 (10th Cir. 1998); Rivera, 144 F.3d at 727-28; Wilson, 148 F.3d at 604;
Carson v. Johnson, 112 F.3d 818, 822 (5th Cir. 1997).
22. See infra notes 179-90 and accompanying text.
23. At least one commentator has argued that the three strikes provision
should not survive even rational basis scrutiny. See Lukens, supra note 2, at
516-17. The argument presented by Lukens relies heavily on Romer v. Evans,
517 U.S. 620 (1996), in which the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a state
constitutional amendment that prohibited any state or local government
protection of lesbians and gay men. Id. at 631-36. The Romer decision
represents the latest in a series of Court decisions striking down state action
under rational basis scrutiny where neither a fundamental right nor a suspect
classification is at issue. See Randal S. Jeffrey, Equal Protection in State
Courts: The New Economic Equality Rights, 17 J. LAW & INEQ. 239, 291 n.275
(1999) (citing Supreme Court decisions striking down challenged state action as
violating equal protection under rational basis scrutiny). Such decisions have
been described as applying rational basis scrutiny with a bite. See, e.g., Gayle
Lynn Pettinga, Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by Any Other
Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779 (1987); Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection,
86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 22 (1972) (describing such cases as "[o]ld equal protection
vith new bite"). However, these decisions arguably misapply rational basis
scrutiny. See Jeffrey, supra, at 350-51. Under a more forthright equal protection
approach, the Court could reach the same result in these decisions by finding
that the challenged state action should be subject to heightened scrutiny based
on the importance of the interests at stake and the manner in which the
interests are deprived. See, e.g., Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S.
432, 456 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). This
latter approach is more appropriate in considering the constitutionality of the
three strikes provision because, in contrast to the Court's rational basis "With a
bite" decisions, the established equal access to the court precedent provides a
basis for finding that the provision burdens a substantive equal protection
right. See infra notes 179-81 and accompanying text.
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applies to all "civil action[s] [and] appeal[s]"24 brought by
prisoners, in practice, most prisoner civil litigation is civil
rights litigation." Other cases, which by definition do not

24. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (Supp. II 1996). It bears mention that, while
petitions for writs of habeas corpus filed in federal court to challenge a state
court judgment of conviction are considered civil actions for certain purposes,
every circuit court to address the issue has held that the PLRA's fee provisions
do not apply to these petitions. See Blair-Bey v. Quick, 151 F.3d 1036, 1041
(D.C. Cir. 1998); Martin v. Bissonette, 118 F.3d 871, 874 (1st Cir. 1997); Carson,
112 F.3d at 820; Smith v. Angelone, 111 F.3d 1126, 1131 (4th Cir. 1997);
Anderson v. Singletary, 111 F.3d 801, 803-06 (l1th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Simmonds, 111 F.3d 737, 741 (10th Cir. 1997); Naddi v. Hill, 106 F.3d 275, 277
(9th Cir. 1997); Santana v. United States, 98 F.3d 752, 756 (3d Cir. 1996);
Martin v. United States, 96 F.3d 853, 855 (7th Cir. 1996); Reyes v. Keane, 90
F.3d 676, 678 (2d Cir. 1996). Similarly, every circuit court to address the issue
has held that the PLRA's fee provisions do not apply to motions brought under
28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct a federal sentence. See United
States v. Levi, 111 F.3d 955, 956 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (per curiam); Simmonds, 111
F.3d at 741; United States v. Cole, 101 F.3d 1076, 1077 (5th Cir. 1996);
Santana, 98 F.3d at 756. The circuit courts also have held that the PLRA fee
provisions do not apply to habeas corpus petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See
Walker v. O'Brien, 216 F.3d 626, 634 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that the PLRA fee
provisions apply to a § 2241 petition challenging the denial of parole), cert.
denied, 531 U.S. 1029 (2000) (overruling Newlin v. Helman, 123 F.3d 429, 43738 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1054 (1998)); Davis v. Fechtel, 150 F.3d
486, 489-90 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that the PLRA fee provisions do not apply
to a § 2241 petition challenging the denial of parole); Blair-Bey v. Quick, 151
F.3d 1036, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (same); McIntosh v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 115
F.3d 809, 811 (10th Cir. 1994) (same). Finally, the circuit courts have held that
whether PLRA's fee provisions apply to a petition for writ of mandamus filed in
a circuit court to compel a district court to act depends upon the nature of the
underlying action in district court. See In re Phillips, 133 F.3d 770, 771 (10th
Cir. 1998) (holding that the PLRA fee provisions do not apply to mandamus
petitions concerning habeas corpus petitions); In re Stone, 118 F.3d 1032, 1034
(5th Cir. 1997) (holding that the PLRA fee provisions apply to mandamus
petitions depending upon the nature of the underlying district court action);
Santee v. Quinlan, 115 F.3d 355, 357 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that the PLRA fee
provisions do not apply to mandamus petitions concerning habeas corpus
petitions); In re Tyler, 110 F.3d 528, 529 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that the PLRA
fee provisions apply to mandamus petitions concerning civil actions); Madden v.
Myers, 102 F.3d 74, 77 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that the PLRA fee provisions do
not apply to mandamus petitions when they do not apply to the underlying
district court action); Martin v. United States, 96 F.3d 853, 854 (7th Cir. 1996)
(holding that the PLRA fee provisions apply to mandamus petitions concerning
civil actions, but not to those concerning criminal litigation); In re Nagy, 89 F.3d
115, 116 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that the PLRA fee provisions do not apply to
mandamus petitions concerning criminal trials, but do apply to those petitions
directed against prison officials as a substitute for § 1983 actions).
25. See Kuzinski, supra note 2, at 362 & n.10 (citing 141 CONG. REC. S749801, S7527 (1995)).
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include claimed violations of federal rights, might be
considered less "fundamental" from a federal constitutional
perspective." In addition, while the three strikes provision
applies to prisoners regardless of their ability to afford the
fee, the right to equal access is only implicated when
prisoners are unable to afford the full filing fee." While the
question of at what point a filing fee becomes "unaffordable"
presents another issue," this article only considers the
constitutionality of the three strikes provision when applied
to prisoners who are unable to afford the fee.
Finally, this article does not dispute the number of
prisoner civil rights cases that occupy the dockets of the
federal courts.2 Nor does this article dispute that a
26. The question of whether the three strikes provision is constitutional
when applied to prisoners unable to afford the filing fee who seek to file noncivil rights civil cases is a more difficult question. As discussed below, the
Supreme Court so far has only extended the right of access to the courts in the
civil context to quasi-criminal and civil rights cases, see infra Part I.A, which
leaves open the question of whether the right of access to the courts
encompasses other civil cases. Furthermore, courts have held that prisoners do
not constitute a suspect class. See, e.g., Webber v. Crabtree, 158 F.3d 460, 461
(9th Cir. 1998); Tucker v. Branker, 142 F.3d 1294, 1300-01 (D.C. Cir. 1998);
Moss v. Clark, 886 F.2d 686, 690 (4th Cir. 1989); Thornton v. Hunt, 852 F.2d
526, 527 (11th Cir. 1988). Accordingly, the three strikes provision most likely
cannot be subject to heightened scrutiny simply on the basis that it only applies
to prisoners. But see Robertson, supra note 2, at 119-40 (arguing that prisoners
constitute a suspect class). While either the right of access to the courts line of
cases or the fact that the three strikes provision applies only to prisoners alone
might not support finding the provision unconstitutional as applied to non-civil
rights civil cases, the importance of equal access, combined with the fact that
the provision applies exclusively to indigent prisoners, might justify subjecting
it to heightened scrutiny under a "composite" equal protection theory sometimes
employed by the Supreme Court. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223-24 (1982)
(subjecting to heightened scrutiny a law denying public education to illegal
immigrant children based on both the importance of education and that the law
discriminated against the class of illegal immigrant children); see also Jeffirey,
supra note 23, at 353-55.
27. The whole line of equal access to the courts cases is premised on the
party challenging the state action being unable to afford some court-related cost
essential to having meaningful access to the courts, whether it be a filing fee,
the cost of transcripts, or the expense of hiring defense counsel. See infra Part
I.A.2.
28. Cf., e.g., In re Epps, 888 F.2d 964, 967 (2d Cir. 1989) ("The discretion
conferred on district judges by section 1915 [to waive filing fees] is to be
exercised so as not to deprive litigants of 'the last dollar they have,' nor the
'necessities of life.'") (citations omitted).
29. See DeWolf, supra note 13, at 257 ("There has been an explosion of civil
rights lawsuits brought by prisoners over the past three decades."); Howard B.
Eisenberg, Rethinking PrisonerCivil Rights Cases and the Provision of Counsel,
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significant number of these cases technically are legally
frivolous."0 However, this article does argue that prohibiting
the filing of civil rights cases based on an inability to pay a
filing fee is an unconstitutional means to reach the goals of
reducing frivolous prisoner lawsuits and conserving judicial
resources.
Part I of this article presents the development and
contemporary scope of the rights of access to the courts and
of equal access to the courts as established by the Supreme
17 S. ILL. U. L.J. 417, 420 (1993) ("By any measure, prisoner civil rights cases
represent a major part of the civil caseload of federal courts."); Hobart, supra
note 2, at 981-82 (citing statistics); Kuzinski, supra note 2, at 362; Lukens,
supra note 2, at 490-93; Riewe, supra note 2, at 117 ("The federal courts
increasingly have been inundated with prisoner litigation."); Schonenberger,
supra note 13, at 457; Sturtz, supra note 13, at 1352 (citing statistics). In this
respect, the PLRA appears to have resulted in a substantial decrease in
prisoner civil rights suits, as the number of such suits decreased 31%, from
41,125 in fiscal year 1996 to 28,635 in fiscal year 1997. See Crawford-El v.
Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 597 n.18 (1998) (citing ADIIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 1997, at 131-33 tbl.C2A (1997)). More recently, the rate of the decrease of prisoner civil rights suits
has slowed down, to an 11.1% decrease from fiscal year 1997 to fiscal year 1999.
See ADafiN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, STATISTICAL TABLES FOR THE FEDERAL
JUDICIARY 28 tbl.C-2 (2000) (noting that there were 25,457 prisoner civil rights
and conditions of confinement suits in fiscal year 1999). While the number of
cases filed by prisoners had increased in the years preceding the enactment of
the PLRA, the number of prisoners had also increased, which could account for
at least some of the increase in prisoner filings. See Eisenberg, supra,at 435-36;
Lukens, supra note 2, at 257 ("Viewed in the context of the corresponding
'explosion' of the prison population, however, such numbers [of prison civil
rights actions] actually are relatively low.").
30. See DeWolf, supra note 13, at 257 ("[T]he truth is that most filings by
prisoners are frivolous."); Stephen M. Feldman, Indigents in the FederalCourts:
The In Forma Pauperis Statute-Equality and Frivolity, 54 FORDHAMI L. REV.
413, 414-15 (1985) ("Most of these [in forma pauperis civil rights] prisoner
complaints are unquestionably meritless."); Hobart, supra note 2, at 981 ("The
amount of frivolous prisoner litigation threatens to choke an already
overburdened judicial system."); Kuzinski, supra note 2, at 364 ("[Ihe majority
of inmate claims are either meritless or overtly frivolous."); Schonenberger,
supra note 13, at 457 ("Many of these [prisoner civil rights] claims are
frivolous."). But ef Eisenberg, supra note 29, at 436-45 (questioning the
common statements about the proportion of prisoner cases that are frivolous);
Lukens, supra note 2, at 493-97 (suggesting that prisoner suits often are
unsuccessful because prisoners do not have the skills or resources to properly
pursue actions and because of judicial antagonism to prisoner suits). The
Supreme Court has defined a complaint as frivolous "where it lacks an arguable
basis either in law or fact"; this definition "embraces not only the inarguable
legal conclusion, but also the fanciful factual allegations." Neitzke v. Williams,
490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
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Court. This Part then discusses the significance of the
Court's most recent equal access to the courts decision,
M.L.B. v. S.L.J.3' Next, this Part develops the concept of
substantive equal protection and demonstrates that the
right of equal access to the courts is a substantive equal
protection right.
Part II of this article demonstrates that, under the
established Supreme Court access to the courts precedent
discussed in Part I, the three strikes provision is
unconstitutional as applied to prisoners seeking to pursue
civil rights cases but who cannot afford the filing fees. This
Part also explores the constitutionality of the three strikes
provision from the substantive equal protection perspective
developed in Part I, concluding that the provision
unconstitutionally burdens the substantive equal protection
right of equal access to the courts.
Part III of this article considers seven arguments,
including those actually discussed by the circuit courts
addressing the provision as well as potential arguments,
finding the three strikes provision constitutional. These
arguments are: (1) the interests that the prisoner seeks to
vindicate are not fundamental; (2) an alternative remedy to
the federal courts is available, namely the state courts; (3)
the prisoner challenging the provision lacked actual injury;
(4) the ability to pursue civil actions is subject to
congressional limitation, since proceeding in forma pauperis
in civil cases is a privilege, not a right; (5) the "imminent
danger" exception guarantees that prisoners with claims
implicating fundamental interests actually are able to raise
such claims in federal court; (6) an alternative remedy to
the
federal
courts
is
available,
namely prison
administrative grievance systems; and (7) the provision
simply reflects the established inherent authority that
courts possess to curtail abusive litigation through the
imposition of injunctions against filing. For each of these
arguments, this article demonstrates how the argument
does not, in fact, support the constitutionality of the three
strikes provision.

31. 519 U.S. 102 (1996).
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT OF EQUAL ACCESS TO
THE COURTS AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO SUBSTANTIVE

EQUAL PROTECTION

A. The Right of EqualAccess to the Courts: Prohibiting
PhysicalBarriersto Litigation
1. Ex parte Hull and the Development of the Right of
Access to the Courts. The right of access to the courts is
well-established in contemporary federal constitutional law
and is not seriously questioned by any member of the
current Supreme Court.3" The Supreme Court first
recognized the right of access to the courts in its 1941
decision Ex parte Hull,33 in which the Court held a prison
regulation authorizing a specified prison official to decline
to forward to a court a prisoner's petition for a writ of
habeas corpus "invalid" on the ground that the petition was
not properly drawn. 4 The Court simply reasoned that only
courts can determine whether a petition is properly
drawn. 5 Although the Court in Ex parte Hull did not
elaborate on the right of access to the courts or even
acknowledge that the case involved such a right,
subsequent Court decisions have interpreted Ex parte Hull
as establishing this right.36 Supreme Court recognition of

32. See, e.g., Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977) ("It is now
established beyond doubt that prisoners have a constitutional right of access to
the courts."); see also DeWolf, supra note 13, at 262. While certain language in
Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Bounds suggests that he did not recognize
the right of access to the courts, see 430 U.S. at 837 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting),
a closer reading of his dissent indicates that he agreed that prisoners have the
right to physical access to the courts, even if he disagreed with the specific scope
of the right as developed by the majority. See id. at 839-40. Furthermore,
Justice Rehnquist subsequently joined in Justice Scalia's majority opinion in
Lewis, which noted: "The right that Bounds acknowledged was the (already
well-established) right of access to the courts." Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350
(1996). Even Justice Thomas, perhaps the current Court's most conservative
member, has recognized the constitutional right of access to the courts. See id.
at 381 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("In the end, I agree that the Constitution
affords prisoners what can be termed a right of access to the courts.").
33. 312 U.S. 546 (1941).
34. Id. at 549.
35. Id.
36. See, e.g., Bounds, 430 U.S. at 821 (stating that the Court recognized the
right of access to the courts in Ex parte Hull).
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the right of access to the courts continues through the
present.37
While the existence of the right of access to the courts is
not disputed, the scope of this right remains unsettled. 8
The Supreme Court in Ex parte Hull initially established
the right not to have state officials actively interfere with a
potential litigant's attempt to file documents with a court."
The Court later extended this right to include the
affirmative obligation of prison authorities to provide
prisoners with the tools necessary to guarantee their access
to courts." Justice Clarence Thomas, however, has disputed
this extension of the right of access to courts to include an
affirmative duty on prison officials.41 Furthermore, the

37. See, e.g., Lewis, 518 U.S. 343; Bounds, 430 U.S. 817; Wolff v. McDonnell,
418 U.S. 539 (1974); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969); 2 MICHAEL B.
MusHLIN, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS § 11.00 (2d ed. 1993).
38. See, e.g., Bounds, 430 U.S. 817 (extending the right of access to the
courts to include certain affirmative obligations on prison officials).
39. See 312 U.S. at 549; see also Lewis, 518 U.S. at 378-79 (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (discussing the significance of Ex parte Hull).
40. See, e.g., Bounds, 430 U.S. at 824 ("[O1ur decisions have consistently
required States to shoulder affirmative obligations to assure all prisoners
meaningful access to the courts."). Extending the right of access to the courts to
include affirmative government obligations is not extraordinary in the prison
context; the Supreme Court has held that the government must provide
prisoners with certain necessities, such as food, water, clothing, and medical
care, that it is under no affirmative constitutional obligation to provide outside
of the prison context. Compare, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832
(1994) (stating that, under the Eighth Amendment, "prison officials must
ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care"),
and Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (stating that the Court's Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence "establish[es] the government's obligation to provide
medical care for those whom it is punishing by incarceration"), with Maher v.
Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 469 (1977) ("The Constitution imposes no obligation on the
[government] to pay the pregnancy-related medical expenses of indigent
women, or indeed to pay any of the medical expenses of indigents."). These
-affirmative obligations are based on the simple fact that prisoners, being
incarcerated, are unable to gain access to basic necessities without affirmative
government action. See, e.g., Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103 ("An inmate must rely on
prison authorities to treat his medical needs; if the authorities fail to do so,
those needs will not be met.").
41. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 384-85 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("Quite simply, there
is no basis in constitutional text, pre-Bounds precedent, history, or tradition for
the conclusion that the constitutional right of access imposes affirmative
obligations on the States to finance and support prisoner litigation."); see also
John Matosky, Illiterate Inmates and the Right of Meaningful Access to the
Courts, 7 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 295, 303-05 (1998) (discussing Justice Thomas's
concurrence in Lewis); David Steinberger, Lewis v. Casey: Tightening the
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Court's more recent decision in Lewis v. Casey limited the
ability of prisoners to challenge the failure of prison officials
to provide them with the means to file suit to those
situations in which this failure results in an actual injury to
the prisoner. 3
As to the source of the right of access to the courts, the
Constitution does not explicitly mention this right.'
Furthermore, the Court in Ex parte Hull did not specify
which provision of the Constitution the challenged prison
regulation violated. 5 However, subsequent Supreme Court
decisions have grounded the right of access to the courts in
the Due Process Clause. The Court did so based on its
conclusion that due process protects the ability of potential
litigants to present claims involving fundamental
constitutional rights."
It bears mentioning that some commentators consider
the right of access to the courts to be a prisoner's most
essential right. This is the case because, without access to

Boundariesof PrisonerAccess to the Courts?, 18 PACE L. REV. 377, 409-13 (1998)

(same).
42. 518 U.S. 343 (1996).

43. Id. at 349-55.
44. See id. at 366 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[The majority opinion in
Bounds failed to identify a single provision of the Constitution to support the
right created in that case...."); Bounds, 430 U.S. at 833 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
45. The Court in Ex parte Hull simply stated, without any citations to the
Constitution, that "[wihether a petition for writ of habeas corpus addressed to a
federal court is properly drawn and what allegations it must contain are
questions for that court alone to determine." 312 U.S. 546, 549 (1941).
46. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 381 (Thomas, J., concurring); Wolff v. McDonnell,
418 U.S. 539, 579 (1974); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 419 (1974);
Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 498 n.24 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring). While
the Court has grounded its access to the court cases in due process, Justice
Thomas has characterized the Court's decision in Ex parte Hull as grounding
this right in federalism. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 379 n.7 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Justice Thomas so characterized Ex parte Hull based on the opinion's citations
to cases holding that the Supreme Court is not bound by state court
adjudication of federal law. Id.
47. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 579 ("The right of access to the courts... is founded in
the Due Process Clause and assures that no person will be denied the
opportunity to present to the judiciary allegations concerning violations of
fundamental constitutional rights."); Procunier,416 U.S. at 419 (describing the
right of access to the courts as a corollary to due process).
48. See, e.g., Sturtz, supra note 13, at 1353 ("The right to have access to the
courts is viewed as the basis of all rights possessed by prisoners."); MuSHLIN,
supra note 37, § 11.00, at 3.
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the
have no judicial mechanism to protect
theircourts,
other prisoners
rights. 49 While non-prisoners also must have
access to the courts in order to enforce their rights,
prisoners require the direct participation of prison officials
for the means to prepare and get their papers to court,
whereas non-prisoners can simply mail court papers or go
to the courthouse themselves to seek to enforce their rights
through litigation.
2. The Right of Equal Access to the Courts: Removing
FinancialBarriersto Litigation. The right of equal access to
the courts also is well-established. In contrast to the right
of access, under which the state cannot prevent litigants
from litigating, the right of equal access serves to guarantee
that litigants who lack the financial resources to afford to
take advantage of the judicial system are relieved of certain
litigation expenses. In particular, the essence of an equal
access claim is that some aspect of litigation, whether it be
a filing fee, a transcript, or counsel, is available only to
those who can afford it, thus treating differently persons
otherwise similarly situated." While the Court has not
frequently used the term "equal access" to distinguish these
cases from those involving the general right of access to the
courts, this is the most appropriate description of the
Griffin v. Illinois5 line of cases."
The Supreme Court first recognized this right in its
landmark 1956 case Griffin v. Illinois, in which the Court
held that when a state affords a defendant the opportunity
to appeal a criminal conviction, the state must allow the
defendant, if unable to afford the trial transcripts, to obtain
the transcripts free of cost.53 The Court reasoned that,
because of the importance of appellate review to the
criminal justice system, principles of equal justice require
that trial transcripts be made available to those who cannot
afford them.54 As the Court itself acknowledged in M.L.B. v.

49. See, e.g., Sturtz, supra note 13, at 1350-51; MUSHLIN, supra note 37, §
11.00, at 3.
50. See infra notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
51. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
52. See Lewis, 518 U.S. 343, 378 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that
the Court's transcript and fee cases "vere about equal access").
53. 351 U.S. at 19.
54. Id. at 16-19.
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S.L.J.,5'5 its most recent equal access decision, since its

decision in Griffin, the Court has developed three
components of the right of equal access to the courts.56
The first component of the right of equal access to the
courts is the right of indigent litigants to obtain a waiver of
court fees to pursue certain actions involving "fundamental
rights." The Supreme Court first established this
component in its 1959 case Burns v. Ohio, " in which the
Court held that the fee to file a motion for leave to appeal to
the state supreme court in a direct criminal appeal must be
waivable." Subsequently, the Court has expanded this
court fee component to include the fee for filing a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus,9 the filing fee and service costs
for initiating a divorce action," and the cost of a blood group
test in a paternity action.6 ' However, the Court has held

that the fee to file for judicial review of an adverse welfare
agency decision and the fee to file a voluntary petition for
bankruptcy 63 are not waivable, even if the prospective
litigant is completely precluded for financial reasons from
bringing such a suit absent the fee waiver.' The Supreme
Court's most recent equal access fee cases have relied on
two factors in determining whether a filing fee is
constitutional: the nature of the right sought to be
vindicated in the action65 and the availability of alternatives
55. 519 U.S. 102 (1996).
56. See id. at 110-16. The Court explained:
In contrast to the "flat prohibition" of "bolted doors" that the Griffin
line of cases [concerning transcripts] securely established, the right to
counsel at state expense, as delineated in our decisions, is less
encompassing.... We have also recognized a narrow category of civil
cases in which the State must provide access to its judicial processes
without regard to a party's ability to pay court fees.
Id. at 112-13.
57. 360 U.S. 252 (1959).
58. Id. at 258.
59. Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 714 (1961).
60. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 380-82 (1971).
61. Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1981).
62. Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 660 (1973) (per curiam).
63. United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 441 (1973).
64. See Lloyd C. Anderson, The Constitutional Right of Poor People to
Appeal Without Payment of Fees: Convergence of Due Process and Equal
Protection in M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 441, 451-59 (1999)
(analyzing the fee component cases).
65. See Little, 452 U.S. at 16 n.12 (noting that the interest in paternity is
constitutionally significant); Ortwein, 410 U.S. at 659 (noting that the interest
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to the judicial forum.66 While the Court has relied on these
two factors, it has not explicitly stated what weight these
factors are to be given in adjudicating whether an
unwaivable filing fee is constitutional.67 In the four cases
that have relied on these two factors in adjudicating such
claims, the Court either found both that the claim was
fundamental and there was no alternative, or found that
the claim was not fundamental and there was an
alternative." Thus, it is unclear whether the Court would
consider one or both factors to be necessary to find that a
fee must be waivable.69
The second component of the right of equal access to the
courts is the right of indigent litigants to obtain trial
transcripts at state expense in direct and collateral attacks
on criminal convictions and in quasi-criminal proceedings.
The Supreme Court first recognized this component in the
Griffin case.7" The Court has expanded the types of
proceedings in which free transcripts must be provided to
include petitions for writs of error coram nobis," appeals

in increased welfare payments is less significant constitutionally than the
interest in being able to dissolve a marriage); Kras, 409 U.S. at 444-45 (noting
that a discharge in bankruptcy is not a fundamental right); Boddie, 401 U.S. at
376 (noting the basic importance of marriage).
66. See Little, 452 U.S. at 16 n.12 (noting that there is no alternative forum
to the paternity action for a defendant to contest paternity); Ortwein, 410 U.S.
at 659 (noting that the appellants had an opportunity to present their claims at
pre-termination evidentiary welfare hearings); Kras, 409 U.S. at 445-46 (noting
that debtors may deal directly with creditors to adjust their debts rather than
pursue bankruptcy through the courts); Boddie, 401 U.S. at 376-77 (noting that
individuals must invoke a judicial forum in order to legally dissolve a
marriage).
67. See Little, 452 U.S. at 16 n.12; Ortwein, 410 U.S. at 659-60; Kras, 409
U.S. at 443-445; Boddie, 401 U.S. at 375-76.
68. See Little, 452 U.S. at 16 n.12; Ortwein, 410 U.S. at 659-60; Kras, 409
U.S. at 443-445; Boddie, 401 U.S. at 375-76.
69. See Christopher E. Austin, Note, Due Process, CourtAccess Fees, and the
Right to Litigate, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 768, 769-73 (1982) (arguing that the
Supreme Court's formulation of the two factors for determining whether a fee
must be waivable has led to uncertainty, as well as inconsistent and confusing
lower court rulings).
70. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956).
71. Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1963). A writ of errorcoram nobis
is a "procedural tool whose purpose is to correct errors of fact only, and its
function is to bring before the court rendering the judgment matters of which, if
known at time judgment was rendered, would have prevented its rendition."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 337 (6th ed. 1991).
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from a conviction for violating a city ordinance,72 appeals in
nonfelony criminal proceedings,73 and appeals from parental
termination hearings.7" In so expanding the right, the Court
has not employed a specific standard, but instead has
stated that this right applies to criminal, quasi-criminal,
and closely related proceedings, such as parental
termination hearings which are "among the most severe
forms of state action." ' The Court, however, has not defined
the scope of this transcript component.76
In addition to the types of proceedings in which
transcripts must be provided, the Supreme Court has had
occasion to further define the scope of the right to
transcripts to include the waiver of fees for the transcripts
of state habeas corpus proceedings 77 and preliminary
hearings in criminal proceedings. 78 As to what type of
transcription must be provided, the Court has held that the
transcript available to pursue a direct criminal appeal must
be more than an abbreviated transcript.79 Finally, the Court
has held that a trial judge cannot deny a free transcript
even upon finding that the direct criminal appeal either
0 On this
would be frivolous or would not promote justice."
final point, the Court reasoned that an indigent defendant's
right to equal access to the appellate process outweighed
any trial court assessment of the merits of the appeal.8 '
The third and final component of the right of equal
access to the courts is the right to government-provided
counsel at trial and on direct criminal appeals as a right.
The Supreme Court first established this component in the
1963 case Gideon v. Wainwright,8 in which the Court held

72. Williams v. Oklahoma City, 395 U.S. 458, 460 (1969) (per curiam).
73. Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 195-96 (1971).
74. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 127-28 (1996).
75. Id. at 120, 124, 128.
76. See id. at 128; cf. Mary McCrory Krupnow, Note, M.L.B. v. S.L.J.:
Protecting Familial Bonds and Creating a New Right of Access in the Civil
Courts, 76 N.C. L. REv. 621, 647 (1998) (noting that the Court in M.L.B. did not
articulate the limits of its holding).
77. Long v. District Court, 385 U.S. 192, 194-95 (1966) (per curiam).
78. Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40, 42 (1967) (per curiam).
79. See Entsminger v. Iowa, 386 U.S. 748, 751-52 (1967).
80. See Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 496-500 (1963); Eskridge v.
Wash. State Bd. of Prison Terms & Parole, 357 U.S. 214, 215-16 (1958) (per

curiam).
81. See Draper,372 U.S. at 499-500; Eskridge, 357 U.S. at 216.
82. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel83 requires states
to appoint lawyers for criminal defendants at trial who lack
the resources to hire a lawyer.84 The Court in Gideon
reasoned that a criminal defendant who cannot afford
counsel cannot be guaranteed a fair trial unless the state
appoints a lawyer to represent the defendant. 8 The Court
later expanded the right to counsel to include direct
criminal appeals as a right.86 However, the Court has held
that the state need not appoint free counsel to indigent
criminal defendants for discretionary appeals.87 In
distinguishing which types of criminal proceedings require
the appointment of free counsel, the Court reasoned that
counsel need only be provided to assure an adequate
opportunity to present claims through those aspects of the
appellate process designed for the purpose of correcting
errors; discretionary appeals fall outside of this category.
The Court has held that the scope of the right to
government-provided counsel includes the right to have
counsel on a direct criminal appeal available to prepare and
submit an appellate brief,89 the right to effective assistance
of appellate counsel," and the right to have the state
establish certain procedures for the withdrawal of appellate
counsel. 9
Although the Court has not characterized the equal
access to the courts cases in this manner, these three
components of the right of equal access to the courts can be
placed in a spectrum in two respects. First, in focusing on
83. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right.., to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
84. 372 U.S. at 342-44. Prior to the Court's decision in Gideon, it had held
that counsel need only be provided to indigent defendants when, based on "the
totality of fact in a given case," such a denial "constitute[d] a denial of
fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of justice." Betts v.
Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942). However, in the Gideon case, the Court
abandoned this flexible standard and established the categorical right to trial
counsel.
85. 372 U.S. at 343-44.
86. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963).
87. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 607-08 (1974).
88. See id. at 615-16.
89. See Swenson v. Bosler, 386 U.S. 258, 259 (1967) (per curiam).
90. See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 393 (1985).
91. See Pension v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 79-80 (1988) (holding unconstitutional
a state procedure for the withdrawal of appellate counsel); Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738, 741-42 (1967) (holding that a court-appointed counsel on appeal
must follow certain procedures before being relieved as counsel).
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the scope of cases covered, the components range from the
counsel component, which encompasses only those
proceedings at the core of a criminal defense, to the filing
fee component, which is broad enough to encompass some
types of civil proceedings.92 Second, as the scope of cases
covered increases, the protections decrease from including
the right to free counsel to only the waiver of fees to file a
case. These characterizations inform the analysis of the
constitutionality of the three strikes provision.
Unlike the right of access to the courts, certain
members of the Court continue to object to the right of
equal access to the courts. Both Justices Thomas and Scalia
have written or joined in opinions urging the abandonment
of the whole line of equal access cases. Justice Thomas first
advocated this position in his concurrence in the access to
the courts case Lewis v. Casey,93 in which he relied on the
school financing case of Rodriguez v. San Antonio
Independent School District" and the antidiscrimination
case of Washington v. Davis95 to support his position. 96 The
Court in Rodriguez, upholding a state school financing
scheme under which poorer school districts received less
funding per student than wealthier school districts, held
that discrimination on the basis of wealth, by itself, does
not trigger strict scrutiny;9' the Court in Washington v.
Davis, upholding a police officer qualifying test that whites
passed at a higher rate than African-Americans, held that
the disparate racial impact of state action, standing alone,
is insufficient to violate equal protection.98 Justice Thomas
argued that these two cases undermined the foundation of
the equal access line of cases because those cases rely on
the proposition that discrimination on the basis of wealth is
suspect and the proposition that state action with only a
disparate impact is suspect.99 More recently, Justice
92. See cases discussed supra notes 52-84 and accompanying text.
93. 518 U.S. 343, 367-79 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring).
94. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
95. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
96. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 374-75 (Thomas, J., concurring).
97. 411 U.S. at 28-29.
98. 426 U.S. at 242.
99. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 373-76 (Thomas, J., concurring). Interestingly,
Justice Thomas need not have addressed the equal access to the courts line of
cases in Lewis at all, as Lewis is an access to courts case. In fact, Justice
Thomas recognized that at least the affirmative obligation aspect of the right of
access to the courts is a right distinct from the right of equal access. See id. at
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Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, in his dissent in M.L.B. v.
S.L.J. reiterated the position that the whole line of equal
access to the courts cases should be abandoned."' Justice
Thomas again relied on Washington v. Davis... in his
dissent, objecting to the concept of substantive equal
protection generally as based on an unwarranted
"equalizing notion. '
Also, unlike the right of access to courts, the Court has
not definitively grounded the right of equal access in a
single provision of the Constitution, but instead has
grounded it variously in equal protection, due process, the
Sixth Amendment, or a combination of these provisions. In
M.L.B., the Supreme Court acknowledged that its counsel
and transcript cases cited both due process and equal
protection as the source of the right.0 3 Then, while
suggesting that these cases were based on equal protection,
the Court rather obviously failed to state which specific
provision it was relying on.' A survey of Supreme Court
373 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("In Bounds, these [transcript and fee] cases were
recharacterized almost beyond recognition, as the Court created a new and
different right on behalf on prisoners. ... "). Nonetheless, Justice Thomas
critiqued the equal access cases in order to undermine what he considered to be
a foundation of the Bounds decision. See id.
It is unclear from Justice Thomas's discussion in Lewis whether he would
include the counsel component of the right of equal access to the courts, namely
Gideon v. Wainwright and its progeny, within his general critique of the equal
access cases. While Justice Thomas does discuss the right to appellate counsel
case of Douglas v. California in his discussion of the Griffin line of cases in
Lewis, 518 U.S. at 371, he repeatedly describes his critique as concerning the
transcript and fee cases. Id. at 371-73, 377-78.
100. See 519 U.S. 102, 139 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("If this case squarely
presented the question, I would be inclined to vote to overrule Griffin and its
progeny.").
101. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
102. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 137 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
103. The Court expounded in M.L.B. as follows: "We observe first that the
Court's decisions concerning access to judicial processes, commencing with
Griffin and running through Mayer, reflect both equal protection and due
process concerns." 519 U.S. at 120; see also Krupnow, supra note 76, at 625-26,
642; Eric K. Weingarten, Comment, An Indeterminate Mix of Due Process and
EqualProtection:The Undertow of In FormaPauperis,75 DENV. U. L. REv. 631,
636-40 (1998).
104. "Nevertheless, '[m]ost decisions in this area,' we have recognized, 'res[t]
on an equal protection framework'.... We place this case within the
framework established by our past decisions in this area." M.L.B., 519 U.S. at
120 (citations and quotations omitted). The Court in the last quoted sentence,
by simply relying on the established equal access "framework," begged the
question of on which constitutional foundation the framework stands. See
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cases upholding equal access challenges reveals that the
Court has relied on equal protection in four cases,0 5 due
process in three cases,' both guarantees in five cases, 0 7 the
Sixth Amendment in one case, 08 and not conclusively
resolved or mentioned which provision it relied upon in
seven cases."0 9 Although a strict counting of the cases
Krupnow, supra note 76, at 626 (noting that "Justice Ginsburg avoided putting
any precise label on the rationale"); see also Weingarten, supra note 103, at 64243. In contrast, Justice Kennedy, in his concurrence, squarely argued that the
right in question was based on due process. 519 U.S. at 128-29 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
Justice Thomas, in his dissent, took the majority to task on its failure to
specify whether the challenged procedure violated due process or equal
protection. See id. at 130 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("It is not clear to me whether
the majority disavows any due process support for its holding.").
105. See Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 241, 243 (1970); Roberts v.
LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40, 42 (1967) (per curiam); Long v. Dist. Court, 385 U.S. 192,
194 (1966) (per curiam); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 709, 714 (1961).
106. See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 391-92, 405 (1985) (stating that both
due process and equal protection support the Griffin line of cases, but that the
equal protection claim had been dropped); Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 16-17 &
n.13 (1981) (holding that the challenged statute violated due process, and
explicitly declining to consider whether the statute violated equal protection as
well); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 380-81 (1971).
107. See M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 120; United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317,
323 (1976) (considering the "Fifth Amendment due process-equal protection
claim"); Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 193 (1971); Anders v. California, 386
U.S. 738, 744 (1967) (referring to "[tihe constitutional requirement of
substantial equality and fair process"); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 16-18
(1956).
108. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). The Court in Gideon
found the counsel component of the right of equal access in the Sixth
Amendments right to counsel. See id. at 339-40. In Evitts v. Lucey, the Court
appeared to distinguish the right to trial counsel as being grounded in the Sixth
Amendment from the right to appellate counsel, which it associated with the
other equal access cases. See 469 U.S. 387, 392 (1985); see also Sundeep
Kothari, Comment, And Justice For All: The Role Equal Protection and Due
Process PrinciplesHave Played in ProvidingIndigents with Meaningful Access
to the Courts, 72 TUL. L. REv. 2159, 2169 (1998) (noting that, because there is
no constitutional right to appeal, the Court relied on a different basis for its
appellate counsel cases than for its trial counsel cases). In any event, it is clear
that the filing fee component of the right of equal access to the courts is not
grounded in the Sixth Amendment.
109. See, e.g., Pension v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1988) (citing the appointed
counsel line of cases but not specifically identifying which constitutional
provision the challenged action violated); Entsminger v. Iowa, 386 U.S. 748,
751-52 (1967); Swenson v. Bosler, 386 U.S. 258 (1967) (per curiam); Draper v.
Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 497-98 (1963) (relying on Griffin and Eskridge
without stating in which constitutional provision the right at issue is grounded);
Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477, 483-85 (1963) (relying on Griffin, Burns, Smith,
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reveals that the Court has slightly favored an equal
protection analysis, as noted, the Court has yet to
conclusively locate the right of equal access to the courts in
a specific constitutional provision.
3. M.L.B. v. S.L.J.: Supreme Court Reaffirmation of the
Right of Equal Access. In 1996, after eight years without
adjudicating an equal access to the courts case, the
Supreme Court decided M.L.B. v. S.L.J."° In M.L.B., the
Court held that an indigent litigant must be allowed to
obtain transcripts of a parental termination hearing free of
cost."' The Court's decision in M.L.B. is critical for
assessing the constitutionality of the three strikes provision
for at least three reasons.
First, the M.L.B. decision demonstrated that the
contemporary Court continues to recognize the right of
equal court access after a relative dearth of equal access
cases; the M.L.B. decision was the only equal court access
case in the 1990s, and followed only three such decisions in
the 1980s."' Since the M.L.B. decision commanded a six
Justice majority, with only Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice
Scalia, and Justice Thomas dissenting,"' it is especially
significant in light of the continuing disagreement by
members of the Supreme Court over the scope and the
continued viability of the equal access to the courts cases
discussed above.l" Thus, the M.L.B. decision demonstrates
that a solid majority of the Supreme Court accepts the
continued force of the equal access line of cases.
and Eskridge without stating in which constitutional provision the right at
issue is grounded); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 256 n.8 (1959) (stating that the
petitioner raised both due process and equal protection claims); Eskridge v.
Wash. State Bd. of Prison Terms & Parole, 357 U.S. 214, 216 (1958) (per
curiam) (relying on Griffin without stating in which portion of the Fourteenth
Amendment the right at issue is grounded).
110. 519 U.S. 102 (1996).
111. Id. at 123-24.
112. For a discussion of the significance of the M.L.B. decision, see
Anderson, supra note 64, at 466-67; Jason T. Jacoby, Note, M.L.B. v. S.L.J.:
"EqualJustice"for Indigent Parents, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 571 (1998); Krupnow,
supranote 76.
113. The three equal access to the courts decisions in the 1980s were Little
v. Streater,452 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1981), Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 393 (1985),
and Pension v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 79-80 (1988).
114. 519 U.S. 102.
115. See supra notes 93-102 and accompanying text.
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Second, the M.L.B. decision is important because it
demonstrates that the Supreme Court is willing to extend
the right of equal access to the courts beyond those
situations clearly encompassed by its precedent. The
contemporary Court, with its conservative bent, generally is
considered to be more inclined to curtail, rather than
extend, individual rights. The M.L.B. decision, however,
demonstrates that the equal access to the courts line of
cases is one of the limited number of areas in which the
Court is willing to expand the scope of the rights that it
protects." 6 In particular, the Court in M.L.B. extended the
transcript component of the right of equal access to the
courts from criminal and "quasi-criminal" proceedings to
those that involve the severest state action." 7 Thus, the
Court might be amenable to extending the filing fee
component of the right of equal access to the courts to civil
rights cases as well.
Third, and of particular importance to the legal
underpinnings of the right of equal access and other related
rights, the Justices in M.L.B. accepted the principle that a
facially neutral statute that has the effect of discriminating
on the basis of poverty can be subject to heightened
scrutiny."' While Justice Scalia joined Justice Thomas's

116. Some of the other areas in which the contemporary Court has extended
its "liberal" decisions also concern equality, such as discrimination on the basis
of gender and sexual orientation. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515,
557 (1996) (holding that Virginia violated equal protection by excluding women
from the Virginia Military Institute); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635-36
(1996) (holding unconstitutional a state constitutional amendment that
prohibited any state or local government protection of lesbians and gay men).
117. 519 U.S. at 124-28.
118. See id. at 125-27. The Court subjected the challenged state action to
the following scrutiny: "[W]e inspect the character and intensity of the
individual interest at stake, on the one hand, and the State's justification for its
exaction, on the other." Id. at 120-21. This heightened level of scrutiny is
neither the traditional equal protection strict scrutiny nor the traditional
intermediate scrutiny, but instead is a balancing test more akin to the
procedural due process standard, see infra note 154 and accompanying text, or
to the "sliding scale" equal protection test advocated by Justice Marshall,
especially in cases concerning poverty and equality. See, e.g., Kadrmas v.
Dickinson Pub. Schs., 487 U.S. 450, 467-69 (1988) (Marshall, J., dissenting);
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 519-21 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
("[C]oncentration must be placed upon the character of the classification in
question, the relative importance to individuals in the class discriminated
against of the governmental benefits that they do not receive, and the asserted
state interest in support of the classification.").
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dissent in M.L.B. advancing the position that disparate

impact alone cannot trigger heightened scrutiny,"

the

majority in M.L.B. squarely rejected this reasoning.'

Instead, the Court concluded that, while the statute at
issue was facially neutral, it nonetheless did not merely
have a disproportionate impact on those in poverty, but
instead applied to all indigent persons. 2 ' This analysis is in
line with both the transcript and filing fee components of
the equal access cases that emphasize that, in practice, the
failure to allow a waiver denies indigents the ability to have
access to the courts. This theme is reiterated time and
again in the equal access cases.'22 It is this aspect of the
right that makes the right of equal access to the courts a
substantive equal protection right. Thus, this article next
discusses the constitutional basis of the right to equal
access to the courts.

119. See 519 U.S. at 134-40 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist did
not join that part of Justice Thomas's dissent that subscribed to the position the
claim in M.L.B. rested on an unsound disparate impact theory. See id. at 129.
120. See id. at 125-28.
121. See id. at 126-27. The Court explained that state barriers to litigation,
such as those at issue in M.L.B., are "wholly contingent on one's ability to pay,
and thus visit different consequences on two categories of persons; they apply to
all indigents and do not reach anyone outside that class." Id. at 127 (quotations
and citation omitted).
122. See, e.g., Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 196 (1971) ("The size of a
defendant's pocketbook bears no more relationship to his guilt or innocence in a
nonfelony than in a felony case."); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 242 (1970)
("In fact, this is an illusory choice for Williams or any indigent who, by
definition, is without funds [to limit confinement by paying a monetary
judgment]."); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) ("[R]eason and
reflection require us to recognize that in our adversary system of criminal
justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be
assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him."); Smith v. Bennett, 365
U.S. 708, 713-14 (1961) ("[Tlhe operation of the statutes under attack has,
perhaps inadvertently, made it available only to those persons who can pay the
necessary filing fees.") (emphasis added); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 257
(1959) ("In Ohio, a defendant who is not indigent may have the Supreme Court
consider on the merits his application for leave to appeal from a felony
conviction. But [by requiring a fee], an indigent defendant is denied that
opportunity."); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17 n.11 (1956) ("[A] law
nondiscriminatory on its face may be grossly discriminatory in its operation.").
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B. EqualAccess to the Courts and Substantive Equal
Protection
A preliminary issue to address before considering the
constitutionality of the three strikes provision is which
specific constitutional provision supports the right to equal
access to the courts, and hence which constitutional
provision the three strikes provision potentially violates.
While it is not necessary to resolve this issue in order to
assess the constitutionality of the three strikes provision,
grounding the right of equal access to the courts in a
to
contributes
provision
constitutional
particular
is
provision
understanding why the three strikes
the
that
by
demonstrating
unconstitutional. Specifically,
equal access cases are part of an established and dynamic
substantive equal protection doctrine, this article explains
why the three strikes provision is unconstitutional despite

the fact that it concerns economic matters 2 3an area in which
the courts usually defer to the legislature.
While the Supreme Court has failed to definitively
ground the right of equal access to the courts in a particular

constitutional

provision,

the

right

is

most

Clause." 4

directly

The claim in
supported by the Equal Protection
are denied
litigants
equal access cases is that indigent
obtain
file
a
case,
able
to
being
access to the courts by not
litigants
these
transcripts, or secure counsel simply because

lack the financial resources to do so, while those who have
123. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970). The impact
of the economic legislation that the Court traditionally defers to can be
distinguished from the rights protected by substantive equal protection on at
least two bases: (1) the economic legislation entitled to deference concerns
business regulation whereas substantive equal protection protects individual
rights; and (2) the economic legislation entitled to deference concerns regulation
of private activity, whereas substantive equal protection rights concern the
appropriateness of government action itself. See Jeffrey, supra note 23, at 30710.
124. The Equal Protection Clause, which is part of the Fourteenth
Amendment, does not directly apply to the federal government and thus, does
not directly apply to the three strikes provision. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §
1 ("nor shall any State... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws") (emphasis added). However, the Supreme Court has
held that equal protection applies with equal force to the federal government
through the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 215-17 (1995); see also Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2
(1975).
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the financial resources are able to take these litigation
steps, despite the fact that these two groups are similarly
situated for all relevant purposes. In other words, the claim
is that the challenged state action treats certain litigants
differently from others who are, for all relevant purposes,
similarly situated.1 25 This is a classic equal protection
claim' 6
While some Supreme Court cases and commentators
have grounded the right of equal access to the courts in due
process, or in a combination of due process and equal
protection,2 . the right of equal access should be grounded
squarely in equal protection. The challenged state action in
the equal access cases does not violate due process because
the challenged fees, transcript costs, and costs of counsel
generally can be constitutionality imposed, as such fees and
costs are not per se unconstitutional. It is only when these
fees and costs are applied to those unable to afford them
that they become constitutionally suspect. Perhaps one
reason that the right of equal access to the courts has not
been squarely grounded in equal protection is that the
Court has not clearly distinguished the access cases from
the equal access cases. 2 1 Separating out the access cases,
which are grounded in due process, leaves the equal access
cases grounded in equal protection. While these rights are
related, they are nonetheless distinct.
The right of equal access to the courts is a substantive
equal protection right. In other words, the right flows
directly from the Equal Protection Clause without being
grounded in other provisions of the Constitution. While
substantive equal protection rights are often related to
125. See cases discussed supraPart I.A.2 and accompanying text.
126. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439
(1985) ("The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands
that no State shall 'deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws,' which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly
situated should be treated alike.").
127. See cases cited supra notes 105-08; see also Anderson, supra note 64, at
443-44 (arguing that the right of equal access to the courts is grounded in a
convergence of equal protection and due process); Krupnow, supra note 76, at
645 (arguing that the right of equal access to the courts is grounded in a
synthesis of procedural due process, substantive due process, and equal
protection).
128. For example, in M.L.B. v. S.L.J., the Court analyzed whether the
challenged state action was constitutional in terms of "access to judicial
processes," 519 U.S. 102, 120 (1996), rather than equal access.
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other constitutional rights,"9 this need not be the case.
Before continuing with this analysis, an explanation of
"substantive equal protection" is in order since this term is
not frequently used.' 3'
Under contemporary Supreme Court doctrine, state
action challenged as violating equal protection is subject to
heightened scrutiny if it burdens a fundamental right or
makes a suspect classification. 3 ' Under the fundamental
rights strand, courts look to other constitutional provisions
to determine whether a right is fundamental."2 Under the
suspect classification strand, courts consider whether equal
protection itself renders a classification suspect."'
129. In this respect the right to counsel cases might be more properly
viewed as a substantive equal protection right stemming from the Sixth
Amendment's right to counsel. Unlike the transcript and fee cases, the equal
access counsel cases are related to an explicit constitutional guarantee, namely
the right to counsel. Cf Pension v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 90 (1988) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) ("There is undoubtedly an equal protection component in the
decisions extending the Sixth Amendment right to counsel on appeal.").
130. The range of rights discussed in this section need not necessarily be
labeled as "substantive equal protection" rights. However, this label best
captures the fact that these rights are based on equal protection and their
substance does not flow from other constitutional provisions, but rather from
equal protection itself. Unlike substantive equal protection, the concept of
substantive due process is well known in constitutional discourse. Although the
Supreme Court did not use the term at the time, substantive due process has
become practically synonymous with certain Lochner era decisions protecting
property rights, decisions that the Court has subsequently disavowed. See, e.g.,
Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730-31 (1963) (discussing the Supreme
Court's rejection of substantive due process). However, more recently the Court
reinvigorated this concept when it grounded the right to privacy in substantive
due process. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846-53 (1992).
131. See, e.g., Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Schs., 487 U.S. 450, 457 (1988).
132. The Supreme Court has stated that the test for determining what is a
fundamental right is "whether there is a right... explicitly or implicitly
guaranteed by the Constitution." San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973); accord Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 n.15 (1982);
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 312 (1980); City of Mobile, Ala. v. Bolden, 446
U.S. 55, 76 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 470 (1977); Moore v. City of E.
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 n.10 (1977); Estelle v. Dorrough, 420 U.S. 534, 538
(1975).
133. The Supreme Court first raised the possibility that certain legislation
directed at "discrete and insular minorities" might be subject to a "more
searching judicial inquiry" than legislation regulating ordinary commerce in the
oft-cited footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144,
153 n.4 (1938). In this footnote, the Court recognized that prejudice against
certain groups "curtail[s] the operation of those political processes ordinarily to
be relied upon to protect minorities." Id. Since its Carolene Products decision,
the Court often has relied on this footnote in adjudicating whether certain
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Generally, when challenged state action neither burdens a
fundamental right nor makes a suspect classification,
rational basis scrutiny is applied.'
Under substantive equal protection, in contrast to the
general rule stated above, certain state action that neither
burdens an independent fundamental right nor makes a
suspect classification nonetheless is subject to heightened
scrutiny. The challenged state action triggers heightened
scrutiny because it concerns the denial of important
interests on a disfavored basis. In this sense, substantive
equal protection is a hybrid of the fundamental right and
suspect classification strands because it draws on the
criteria from both strands to determine when substantive
equal protection rights are created.'35 For example, in the
equal access context, access to the courts is an important
interest and its denial on the basis of poverty is disfavored;
these two criteria combine to create a distinct right of equal
access to the courts." 6
Despite the fact that the Supreme Court has at times
asserted that the Equal Protection Clause does not create

classifications are suspect, see City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Ctr.,
Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 472 n.24 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring and dissenting);
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 n.14 (1982); Massachusetts Bd. of Ret. v.
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 105 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Graham v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 365, 372 (1971), and at times has summarized the test for determining
whether a classification is suspect as whether state action that makes the
classification disadvantages a "discrete and insular minority." See, e.g., Graham
v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (describing "aliens" as "a prime example
of a 'discrete and insular' minority"). The question of whether a class is suspect
also has been described as flexible, and not amenable to being tied to any one
particular test. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 472 n.24 (Marshall, J., concurring and
dissenting).
134. See, e.g., Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 799 (1997).
135. It also should be noted that the dissenters in Plyler contended that the
majority used a combined quasi-suspect classification, quasi-fundamental rights
approach. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 244 (1982) (Burger, J., dissenting).
136. Alternatively, rather than viewing the right of equal access to the
courts as a distinct substantive equal protection right, it is possible to view this
right in terms of the scope of state action that burdens the right of access to the
courts. However, from this perspective, whether financial obstacles burden a
fundamental right would depend on the nature of the right, such that the
standard of whether state action burdens a fundamental right would differ.
Thus, this perspective is not as consistent as the substantive equal protection
approach.
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any substantive rights,"' the Court has in fact guaranteed
substantive equal protection rights in areas other than
equal access to the courts. For example, in the voting rights
context, the Supreme Court has held that, while a state
need not grant the vote as to certain public officials, if the
state does grant the vote, then equal protection prevents
the diminishment or exclusion of the vote."8 One aspect of
the equal right to vote is that a state cannot impose a fee on
voting."9 While the right to vote in certain elections is not a
fundamental right, and wealth is not a suspect
classification, making the vote contingent upon financial
resources burdens what can be termed a substantive equal
protection right to an equal vote. In fact, the Court in
M.L.B. specifically relied on the voting rights cases as an
exception to the general rule that fees, which can be
categorized as economic legislation, are not ordinarily
subject to heightened scrutiny. 4 °
Similarly, in the interstate travel context, the Supreme
Court has held that, while a state need not provide welfare
benefits, once a state decides to provide these benefits to its
residents it cannot deny such benefits to more recent
arrivals.' While welfare is not a fundamental right. and,
in general, a state can discriminate against new arrivals in

137. See Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 799 (1997) ("The Equal Protection
Clause... creates no substantive rights."); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 322
(1980) ("The guarantee of equal protection under the Fifth Amendment is not a
source of substantive rights or liberties .... "); Zablocki v. Redhall, 434 U.S.
374, 391 (1978) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("The Equal Protection Clause deals
not with substantive rights or freedoms .... "); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33 (1973) ("It is not the province of this Court to create
substantive constitutional rights in the name of guaranteeing equal protection
of the laws.").
138. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 628-29
(1969) ("The need for exacting judicial scrutiny of statutes distributing the
franchise is undiminished simply because, under a different statutory scheme,
the offices subject to election might have been filled through appointment.");
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966) ("[Olnce the
franchise is granted to the electorate, lines may not be drawn which are
inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
139. Harper,383 U.S. at 665.
140. See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 123-24 & n.14 (1996).
141. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (holding
unconstitutional a state law that denied welfare benefits to those residing in
the state for less than one year).
142. See Jefferson v. Hackney 406 U.S. 535, 546-47 (1972); Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484-86 (1970).
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the provision of benefits,' denying welfare benefits to new
arrivals does burden a fundamental right. This right is
actually a substantive equal protection right of new state
residents to receive government benefits on an equal basis
to those already residing in the state.
In each of these areas of substantive federal
constitutional law, a specific substantive right is grounded
in equal protection and that right, when burdened, triggers
heightened scrutiny.' Importantly, each of these areas
concerns financial barriers to the exercise of a fundamental
right or an important interest. By finding the challenged
action unconstitutional in these contexts, the Court has
recognized the real world impact of the challenged state
action on those with little or no resources."' This is
analogous to the equal access to the courts context, in which
the Court has recognized that the actual impact of the
challenged state action is to effectively deny access to the
courts.'
Thus, these rights form the basis of a
constitutional jurisprudence that allows for equality in
some contexts without raising poverty to a general suspect
classification.'47
While the Supreme Court has generally stated that
equal protection is not a source of substantive rights, in the

143. For example, states can limit access to its schools to bona fide
residents, which includes imposing a waiting time before new residents can
take advantage of lower, in-state tuition at state universities. See Vlandis v.
Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452-53 & n.9 (1973).
144. In addition to the voting rights and interstate travel contexts, the
Supreme Court also has employed the neutrality doctrine to protect substantive
equal protection rights. In particular, the Court has, in the free speech context,
prohibited state funding of speakers in a manner that discriminates on the
basis of viewpoint and, in the Establishment Clause context, prohibited state
dispensation of benefits to religious groups or individuals on a non-neutral
basis. See Jeffrey, supranote 23, at 328-30.
Two substantive equal protection rights that the Supreme Court has failed
to recognize are the right to equal school financing, see San Antonio Indep. Sch.
Dist.v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), and the right to abortion funding when
general medical coverage is provided to those in poverty. See generally Harris v.
McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977). A number of
state courts, however, have recognized these substantive equal protection
rights. See Jeffrey, supra note 23, at 274-76 (education financing), 283-85
(abortion fimding).
145. See Jeffrey, supra note 23, at 337-39.
146. See supra note 122.
147. See Jeffrey, supra note 23, at 342-43.
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abortion funding case of Harris v. McRae,' 48 while
reiterating this general statement, the Court also noted
that the equal right to vote line of cases is an exception to
this general rule."' This is an important acknowledgment.
Since the right of equal access to the courts is structurally
similar to the equal right to vote, 5 ' the Court could, without
breaking new ground, acknowledge that the right of equal
access to the courts is another exception to the general rule
that the Equal Protection Clause does not create
substantive rights.
The one practical consequence of determining which
constitutional provision underlies the right of equal access
to the courts comes when determining the standard under
which state action challenged as violating equal access is
judged. Under contemporary equal protection doctrine,
state action that burdens a fundamental right is subject to
strict scrutiny. 5 The action will survive strict scrutiny only
if the state action furthers a compelling state interest that
cannot be achieved by less intrusive means.152 Since this
standard is quite difficult to meet, state action judged
under this standard rarely survives.' By contrast, under

148. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
149. Id. at 322 & n.25; see also Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 60 n.6 (1982)
("In reality, the right to travel analysis refers to little more than a particular
application of equal protection analysis.").
150. See infra notes 137-40 and accompanying text.
151. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973). It is arguable whether
state action that burdens a substantive equal protection right may be subject to
a degree of scrutiny other than strict scrutiny. Under current Supreme Court
doctrine, once state action burdens a fundamental right, strict scrutiny is
applied. The suspect classification aspect does allow for intermediate scrutiny,
although even that standard is moving toward strict scrutiny. See United States
v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) (while citing the established intermediate
scrutiny standard, stating that "[plarties who seek to defend gender-based
government action must demonstrate an 'exceedingly persuasive justification'
for that action"). However, in light of the fact that substantive equal protection
rights differ significantly from traditional fundamental rights, courts might feel
free to develop their own standards for judging state action that burdens such
rights. For example, in M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 120-21 (1996), the
Supreme Court judged the challenged state action under a standard outside the
traditional three-tiered equal protection approach. See supranote 118.
152. See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 155-56.
153. Although strict scrutiny has been described as "'strict' in theory and
fatal in fact," Gunther, supra note 22, at 8, the Supreme Court has actively
disputed this description. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237
(1995) ("[W~e wish to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is strict in theory, but
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procedural due process, courts subject challenged state
action to a flexible standard, examining "the private
interests at stake; the risk that the procedures used will
lead to erroneous results and the probable value of the
suggested procedural safeguard; and the governmental
interest affected."'54 Clearly, the due process standard is
more flexible than the strict scrutiny equal protection
standard. At the same time, an equal protection analysis
requires two steps. The challenged state action must first
be found to burden a fundamental right, and if it does, then
it is subject to heightened scrutiny. Under due process, the
challenged state action is subject to the balancing test
without having to pass any initial step.
While there may be a difference in theory, and even
different standards under which challenged action is judged
under these different theories, the constitutionality of the
three strikes provision does not depend on the source of the
right of equal access to the courts. Whether the right is
grounded in due process, or, as is argued for here,
substantive equal protection, Supreme Court precedent
compels a finding that the three strikes provision is
unconstitutional as applied to persons seeking to bring civil
rights cases but who are unable to afford the filing fees.'
However, viewing the right of equal access as a substantive
equal protection right adds clarity to the discussion of the
right.'

fatal in fact.") (internal quotations omitted); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S.
515, 532 n.6 (1996) (quoting Adarand).
154. Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 13 (1981) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
155. See infra notes 160-78 and accompanying text. In this regard, since the
Supreme Court itself has refrained from locating the right of equal access in a
particular constitutional provision, the Court appears comfortable in finding
that challenged state action violates equal access without finding the right in a
specific provision. See Krupnow, supra note 76, at 645. Similarly, for a
considerable period of time, the Supreme Court adjudicated right to privacy
cases without finding this right in a specific constitutional provision. See, e.g.,
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973). Only in PlannedParenthoodv. Casey did
a majority of the Court hold that the right to privacy is grounded in due process.
See 505 U.S. 833, 846-53 (1992)
156. See infra notes 179-90 and accompanying text.
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II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE
THREE STRIKES PROVISION

Having explained the scope of the right of equal access
to the courts, as developed by the Supreme Court, the
constitutionality of the three strikes provision can now be
assessed. First, the constitutionality of the three strikes
provision will be examined strictly in light of Supreme
Court precedent. Then, the provision's constitutionality will
be assessed under a substantive equal protection analysis.
Under both of these approaches, it will be demonstrated
that the three strikes provision is unconstitutional.
In assessing the constitutionality of the three strikes
provision, it is essential to focus on exactly what application
of the three strikes provision is challenged. The text of the
three strikes provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act
is as follows:
In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a
judgment in a civil action or proceeding under this section if the
prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or
detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of
the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is
frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of
serious physical injury.

This provision has four key components: (1) it only
applies to prisoners; (2) it applies to civil actions and
appeals; (3) it applies when the prisoner has "three strikes";
and (4) it does not apply if the prisoner "is under imminent
danger of serious physical injury."'58 Thus, the present
analysis concerns the application of the provision precisely
to prisoners with three strikes who seek to file a civil action
or appeal and who do not fall within the imminent danger
exception. In addition, the analysis explores situations in
which the prisoners seek to file a civil rights action or
appeal but are unable to afford the filing or appellate fee.
Currently, these fees are $150 to file a civil action in district
court and $105 to file an appeal in the courts of appeals.'59
157. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (1994 & Supp. V 1994).
158. Id.
159. 28 U.S.C. § 1914 (1994 & Supp. V 1994); Henderson v. Norris, 129 F.3d
481, 483 n.3 (8th Cir. 1997). While the civil filing fees might appear affordable,
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The Supreme Court precedent discussed above compels
the finding that the three strikes provision is
unconstitutional as applied to prisoners who seek to bring a
civil rights action but who are unable to afford the filing
fees. In particular, the Supreme Court's holding in the
160
equal access to the courts case of Smith v. Bennett
combined with the Court's reasoning in the access to the
courts case of Wolff v. McDonnell.6 ' leads to this conclusion.
In Smith v. Bennett, a unanimous Supreme Court held
unconstitutional a non-waivable fee to file a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus in state court when this fee was
applied to a petitioner unable to afford the fee.'62 The Court
did not need to provide extensive analysis in reaching this
result, as the Court already had held unconstitutional a
non-waivable fee to file a motion for leave to appeal a state
court criminal conviction in Burns v. Ohio.' The Burns
decision itself was an extension of the landmark case of
Griffin v. Illinois, in which the Court held that indigent
defendants must be provided a free trial transcript for their
direct appeal from a judgment of conviction.' With the
Griffin and Burns precedent, extending the rule that
unaffordable court fees is unconstitutional to another type
was
convictions
criminal
attacking
action
of
straightforward.'65
such a view does not take into the account the reality of prisoner finances. See
Eisenberg, supra note 29, at 470 (noting that a case file review of prisoners
suits "demonstrate[s] that virtually every prisoner filing a civil rights action
lacks the ability to pay the [former] standard filing fee of $120"). The only funds
that prisoners have access to are those in their prisoner commissary accounts,
and the remuneration for prisoner work is especially low, especially since the
federal minimum wage does not apply to prisoners. See, e.g., McMaster v.
Minnesota, 30 F.3d 976, 978 (8th Cir. 1994) (citing cases), cert. denied, 513 U.S.
1157 (1995).
160. 365 U.S. 708, 714 (1961).
161. 418 U.S. 539, 579-80 (1974).
162. See Smith, 365 U.S. at 714 (1961) ("In failing to extend the privilege of
the Great Writ to its indigent prisoners, Iowa denied them equal protection of
the laws.").
163. 360 U.S. 252, 258 (1959).
164. 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956).
165. While the Court in Smith held unconstitutional a trial court filing fee,
its reasoning is equally applicable to appeals as a right since such appeals are
an integral aspect of being able to pursue a case. See 365 U.S. at 709.
Analogously, in the counsel component of the equal access line of cases, the
Court has held that counsel must be supplied both at the trial level and for
appeals as a rights, treating the requirements of equal access for appeals the
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In addition to its specific holding, the Court's reasoning
in Smith is important for assessing the constitutionality of
the three strikes provision. In particular, the Court
explicitly rejected the three arguments raised in support of
the constitutionality of the challenged filing fee, arguments
that are similar to those advanced to support the
constitutionality of the three strikes provision. First, the
Court dismissed the state's argument that it could impose a
non-waivable filing fee on habeas petitions because such
petitions are merely civil actions; the Court rejected this
simplified labeling, noting instead that the fundamental
nature of such petitions is what matters, and citing to the
historical context of the writ. 166 Next, the Court implicitly
rejected the state's argument that, since the habeas
proceeding at issue was authorized by state statutory law,
the state could limit the availability of the proceeding by
statute.16 Finally, the Court rejected the state's argument
that it could impose a non-waivable filing fee because
federal habeas corpus petitions remained available to
prisoners financially barred from state court; the Court
instead noted that the state should not deny access to68 its
courts simply because the federal courts were available.'
The Supreme Court's access to the courts line of cases
provides the rationale for extending the Smith decision
from habeas corpus petitions to civil rights cases. The Court
in Johnson v. Avery 69 held that, in the absence of
reasonable alternatives, prisoners may not be disciplined
for providing fellow prisoners assistance in preparing
petitions for writs of habeas corpus.' ° In Wolff v.
McDonnell,'' the Court unanimously extended this aspect
of Avery from habeas corpus petitions to civil rights actions

same as the requirements in the trial court. See supra notes 82-91 and
accompanying text.
166. See Smith, 365 U.S. at 712-13.
167. See id. at 711-14. While the Court did not explicitly reject the argument
that the scope of habeascould be limited by statute, it did mention that this was
one of the three arguments that the state had raised in support of the
constitutionality of the filing fee, and then went on to hold the fee
unconstitutional. See id.
168. Id. at 713.
169. 393 U.S. 483, 487-90 (1969)
170. Id.
171. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
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brought pursuant to § 1983."2 The Court reasoned as

follows:

First, the demarcation line between civil rights actions and habeas
petitions is not always clear.... Second, while it is true that only
in habeas actions may relief be granted which will shorten the
term of confinement, it is more pertinent that both actions serve to
protect basic constitutional rights. The right of access to courts,
upon which Avery was premised, is founded in the Due Process
Clause and assures that no person will be denied the opportunity
to present to the judiciary allegations concerning violations of
fundamental constitutional rights. It is futile to contend that the
Civil Rights Act of 1871 has less importance in our constitutional
scheme than does the Great Writ. 173

The Court concluded that it could "[Mind no reasonable
distinction between the two forms of action."174 As this text
indicates, the Supreme Court considered civil rights actions
to be as "fundamental" as habeas corpus petitions in an
access to the courts case.' 5
The Court's holding in Smith and its reasoning in Wolff
compel the finding that the three strikes provision is
unconstitutional when applied to prisoners seeking to file
civil rights actions or appeals who cannot afford the filing
fees. The Court in Smith held that the habeas corpus filing
fee must be waivable and Wolff reasoned that civil rights
actions are as important as habeas actions for access to the
courts purposes. If an indigent prisoner cannot be denied
the ability to file a habeascorpus case by the imposition of a
filing fee and civil rights cases are as important as habeas
corpus petitions, then an indigent prisoner cannot be denied
the ability to file a civil rights case by an unaffordable filing
fee.
One could argue that the Court's statements in Wolff
equating the importance of civil rights actions with habeas
172. Id. at 569-70
173. Id. at 579 (citations omitted).
174. Id. at 580; see also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 354 (1996)
(recognizing that Wolff had extended the right of access to the courts "to 'civil
rights actions'--i.e., actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to vindicate 'basic
constitutional rights'").
175. While the Court in Wolff adjudicated a claim brought under § 1983, the
same reasoning should apply to civil rights claims brought under Bivens. Civil
rights claims are as important to federal prisoners as § 1983 claims are to state
prisoners.
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corpus actions are merely dicta.' However, other sources
amply support the fundamental importance of civil rights
cases. For example, the Supreme Court has recognized the
importance of civil rights action in numerous other
decisions.1 ' Furthermore, § 1983 simply facilitates
challenges to the deprivation of federal rights, including
federal constitutionalrights; constitutional rights sought to
be vindicated through § 1983 are, by definition,
fundamental.' 8 Given the fundamental importance of civil
rights cases, the right to file such cases cannot be made
contingent upon the financial resources of the litigant.
176. Considering the Court's statements in Wolff about civil rights actions
to be dicta assumes that drawing such a distinction between the "holding" and
"dicta" is meaningful, which is not an undisputed proposition. See generally
Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997 (1994)
(challenging the usual court analysis of the distinction between holding and
dicta, and instead arguing for "a rationale-focused holding/dictum distinction").
177. For example, in City of Riverside v. Rivera, the Supreme Court wrote
that
we reject the notion that a civil rights action for damages constitutes
nothing more that a private tort suit benefiting only the individual
plaintiffs whose rights were violated. Unlike most private tort litigants,
a civil rights plaintiff seeks to vindicate important civil and
constitutional rights that cannot be valued solely in monetary terms.
477 U.S. 561, 574 (1986). The Court further noted that "the damages a plaintiff
recovers contributes significantly to the deterrence of civil rights violations in
the future." Id. at 575.
178. Cf San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33 (1973).
Section 1983 is available to enforce both constitutional and certain nonconstitutional federal rights. See Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340-41
(1997). To be enforceable, a non-constitutional right must be intended to benefit
those seeking to assert the rights, and must unambiguously bind the states to
protect the right. See id.
Arguably, for purposes of the constitutionality of the three strikes provision,
it might matter whether the claim frustrated by the three strikes provision is
constitutional or not. Focusing on the Wolff decision, which established the
fundamental nature of civil rights claims for equal access purposes, while the
Court at times appeared to emphasize constitutional claims, see Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 578 (1974) ("both [civil rights actions and habeas
petitions] serve to protect basic constitutional rights"), it emphasized the
importance of civil rights actions generally without drawing a distinction
between constitutional and non-constitutional claims, see id. at 579 ("It is futile
to contend that the Civil Rights Act of 1871 has less importance in our
constitutional scheme than does the Great Writ."). Perhaps one reason for the
Court's ambiguity in Wolff is that it was not until six years later, in Maine v.
Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1980), that the Court first clearly held that § 1983 is
available to enforce non-constitutional rights. Nonetheless, to the extent that
the Civil Rights Act encompasses non-constitutional claims, these claims should
be treated the same as constitutional claims. See id.

1138

BUFFALOLAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

While the above analysis simply follows the logic of the
Supreme Court cases without subjecting the three strikes
provision to any particular scrutiny, the same result is
reached when considering whether the provision violates
the substantive equal protection right of equal access to the
courts. The first step in reaching this result is to determine
the scope of the particular substantive equal protection
right at issue. Thus, the question is whether the right of
equal access encompasses being able to pursue a civil rights
case without being subject to an unaffordable filing fee.
Given the Supreme Court precedent discussed above,' it is
clear that the right of equal access to the courts
encompasses the right to have the fees waived to pursue
civil rights cases. This is especially the case because such a
right is part of the fee component of the right of equal
access to the courts, which is the component that covers the
broadest range of cases. 8 °
The next question in the equal protection analysis is
whether the three strikes provision burdens the right of
equal access to the courts. As applied to those who cannot
afford the filing fee, the three strikes provision clearly
burdens this right because it completely prevents such
potential litigants from being able to file an action or
appeal, and thus having access to the courts to pursue civil
rights cases.'' In fact, financial obstacles by definition
burden substantive equal protection rights.
Once it is established that the three strikes provision
burdens the right of equal access to the courts, the final
question in considering the provision's constitutionality is
whether it survives strict scrutiny. As noted, the strict
scrutiny test, which is quite difficult to meet, is whether the
challenged action serves a compelling interest and is the
least restrictive alternative. 2 One purpose of the three

179. See supranotes 162-75 and accompanying text.
180. See supranote 92 and accompanying text.
181. See Franklin, supra note 13, at 202-03; Lukens, supra note 2, at 501
("[Slection 1915(g) clearly burdens the affected prisoners' constitutional rights
to challenge the conditions of their confinement by establishing a blanket
prohibition against the most important tool necessary to access federal courts to
vindicate deprivations of those rights .... ."); Riewe, supra note 3, at 147 ("The
three strikes provision... deprives these prisoners of all access to the courts,
unless they can pay the full filing fee upon filing suit.").
182. See supranotes 152-53 and accompanying text.
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strikes provision is to limit frivolous prisoner lawsuits.'83
While certainly an important interest, it is unclear whether
it rises to the level of being a compelling interest." Even
assuming that limiting frivolous prisoner lawsuits is a
compelling purpose, the three strikes provision is not the
least restrictive alternative to achieve this purpose of
limiting such suits. In particular, courts have the authority
and, under the PLRA, the duty to dismiss frivolous
complaints sua sponte even before service on the
defendants. ' This mechanism is much more narrowly
tailored to the purpose of limiting frivolous lawsuits. By
contrast, the three strikes provision is much too broad,
since once a prisoner accrues three strikes, the provision
applies to subsequent cases regardless of whether they are
M

183. See Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 318-19 (3d Cir. 2001), cert.
denied, 121 S. Ct. 2600 (2001); Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1181 (9th Cir.
1999); White v. Colorado, 157 F.3d 1226, 1234 (10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526
U.S. 1008 (1999); Wilson v. Yaklich, 148 F.3d 596, 604 (8th Cir. 1998); Rivera v.
Allin, 144 F.3d 719, 727 (11th Cir. 1998); Hadix v. Johnson, 143 F.3d 246, 250
(6th Cir. 1998) ("The second purpose of the [PLRA was to stem the tide of
frivolous prisoner suits."), affd in part and rev'd in part, 527 U.S. 343 (1999);
Carson v. Johnson, 112 F.3d 818, 822 (5th Cir. 1997); Franklin, supra note 13,
at 191 & n.4 (citing 141 CONG. REC. 14,570 (1995) for the proposition that "[tihe
primary aim of the PLRA was to reduce the number of frivolous prisonerinitiated lawsuits").
184. Cf. Lukens, supra note 2, at 501-02 (arguing that it is doubtful that the
purpose of reducing prisoner litigation is compelling).
185. The PLRA codified this authority as to prisoners' complaints as follows:
(a) SCREENING.-The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or,
in any event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a
civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental
entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.
(b) GROUNDS FOR DISAUSSAL.-On review, the court shall identify
cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the
complaint, if the complaint(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A (Supp. III 1997); see Franklin, supra note 13, at 203-05
(arguing that the provisions of the PLRA that impose partial fee payments,
require judicial screening, and authorize the revocation of good time credits
serve as adequate alternatives to deter the filing of frivolous cases); Lukens,
supra note 2, at 502. Prior to the enactment of the PLRA, courts had the
authority to dismiss frivolous complaints and appeals sua sponte. See, e.g.,
Fitzgerald v. First East Seventh Street Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 363-64 (2d
Cir. 2000).
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frivolous or meritorious.'86 Thus, the three strikes provision
is not the least restrictive means to achieve the goal of
limiting frivolous prisoner lawsuits.
Similarly, to the extent that the three strikes provision
seeks to conserve limited judicial resources,' 7 it is arguable
whether the provision serves a compelling interest. 88
However, the three strikes provision is far from narrowly
tailored to achieved this goal, as there are alternatives for
the judiciary to conserve its resources.8 9 For example,
courts already have the authority to sanction abusive or
vexatious litigants as a means of controlling their dockets. 9 '
This alternative is in fact better tailored to the purpose of
conserving judicial resources, as under this alternative
courts themselves are responsible for controlling access to
their own dockets. Given that there are less restrictive
alternatives to achieve either purpose of the three strikes
provision, it is clear that the provision fails strict scrutiny
and therefore unconstitutionally burdens the right of equal
access to the courts.
Given the straightforward argument that Supreme
Court precedent compels finding the three strikes provision
unconstitutional, as well as the argument that the provision
violates the substantive equal protection right of equal
access to the courts, it is surprising that seven circuit courts
have upheld its constitutionality. In so doing, these courts
have relied on a number of arguments. The next Part of this
article explores these arguments, as well as some additional
arguments for its constitutionality, and finds them all
wanting.
III. AN ANALYSIS OF THE ARGUMENTS FOR THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE THREE STRIKES PROVISION

The Third, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and
Eleventh Circuits-the seven circuit courts that so far have
186. See Lukens, supranote 2, at 503.
187. See Rivera, 144 F.3d at 727; Carson, 112 F.3d at 822.
188. See Lukens, supra note 2, at 502 (arguing that the interest in
conserving judicial resources "generally is not compelling because it is the
business of the courts to adjudicate disputes").
189. See Franklin, supra note 13, at 202-03.
190. See infra Part III.G; see also Lukens, supra note 2, at 504 (arguing that
the authority of courts to sanction abusive litigants is a less restrictive
alternative to the three strikes provision); Riewe, supra note 3, at 149 (same).
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passed on the constitutionality of the three strikes provision
of the Prison Litigation Reform Act-have all found this
provision constitutional."' These courts have relied on the
following reasons in finding the provision constitutional: (1)
the interests that the prisoner challenging the provision
sought to vindicate through filing the cases were not
fundamental;192 (2) an alternative remedy to the federal
courts was available, namely the prisoner could bring a case
in state court; 93 (3) the prisoner challenging the provision
lacked actual injury as required by the Supreme Court in
Lewis v. Casey; (4) the ability to pursue civil actions is
subject to congressional limitation, since proceeding in
95
forma pauperis in civil actions is a privilege, not a right;
and (5) the "imminent danger" exception guarantees that
prisoners with claims implicating fundamental interests
actually are able to raise such claims in federal court. 96 In
addition to these arguments, there are at least two other
possible reasons to find the three strikes provision
constitutional: (1) an alternative remedy to the federal
courts is available, namely prisoners can pursue their
claims through the prison administrative systems; and (2)
the provision simply reflects the established inherent
authority that courts possess to curtail abusive litigation
through the imposition of injunctions against filing. This
Part discusses each of these arguments for upholding the
three strikes provision, and finds that each actually fails to
support the constitutionality of the three strikes provision.

191. See Higgins v. Carpenter, 258 F.3d 797 (8th Cir. 2001); Abdul-Akbar v.
McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307 (3d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 2600 (2001);
Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176 (9th Cir. 1999); White v. Colorado, 157 F.3d
1226 (10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1008 (1999); Rivera, 144 F.3d 719;
Wilson v. Yaklich, 148 F.3d 596 (6th Cir. 1998); Carson, 112 F.3d 818.
192. See Rodriguez, 169 F.3d at 1180; White, 157 F.3d at 1233-34; Rivera,
144 F.3d at 724; Carson, 112 F.3d at 821.
193. See Abdul-Akbar, 239 F.3d at 318; Wilson, 148 F.3d at 605; see also
Rivera, 144 F.3d at 724 n.9 (noting, but not relying on, the reasoning in Wilson).
194. See White, 157 F.3d at 1234.
195. See Abdul-Akbar, 239 F.3d at 317; Rodriguez, 169 F.3d at 1180; White,
157 F.3d at 1233; Rivera, 144 F.3d at 723.
196. See Higgins, 258 F.3d at 800; Abdul-Akbar, 239 F.3d at 319; White, 157
F.3d at 1234.

1142

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

A. The Nature of the Interest Sought to Be Vindicated
In upholding the constitutionality of the three strikes
provision, the Fifth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits
have relied on the argument that the provision could be
applied constitutionally since those challenging the
provision failed to demonstrate that they sought to
vindicate a fundamental interest.'97 This argument derives
from the Supreme Court's equal access fee cases, in which
the Court identified the nature of the action that a potential
litigant seeks to bring as a factor in determining whether
the imposition of an unaffordable filing fee is
constitutional.9 Those courts relying on this argument,
however, ignored the Supreme Court's remarks recognizing
the importance of civil rights actions.'99 To some extent, this
failure can be explained by the fact that these courts
examined the specific claims sought to be raised, finding
these claims not to concern fundamental interests, rather
than examining the more general question of whether civil
rights actions concern fundamental interests. However, as
demonstrated below, such a method of adjudicating the
constitutionality of the three strikes provision is both
theoretically and practically unsound.
In answering the question of whether the potential
litigant sought to vindicate a fundamental interest, the
Fifth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits each focused on
the specifics of the claim that the potential litigant sought
to raise. In considering these claims, each court found that
the claims did not raise a fundamental interest. In
particular, these courts found that no fundamental interest
was at stake when: (1) a prisoner sought a transfer out of
administrative segregation but had no liberty interest in
avoiding administrative segregation;. 0 (2) a prisoner
alleged that the prison doctor disregarded his medical
needs and fondled him but did not allege that the doctor
20
was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs; '
(3) a prisoner failed to demonstrate deliberate indifference

197. See Rodriguez, 169 F.3d at 1180; White, 157 F.3d at 1234; Rivera, 144
F.3d at 724; Carson, 112 F.3d at 821.
198. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 177-78 and accompanying text.
200. Carson, 112 F.3d at 821.
201. Rivera, 144 F.3d at 724.
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to his serious medical needs; °2 and (4) a prisoner failed to
implicate the right of access to the courts in challenging the
number of postage stamps provided to him.03 Since these
courts considered the specific claims raised by the potential
litigants to determine whether a fundamental interest was
at stake, these courts employed what can be termed an "as
applied" approach to the constitutionality of the three
strikes provision.
Before considering its persuasiveness, it is essential to
note that the "as applied" approach employed by the Fifth,
Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits leaves open the
possibility that these courts still might find the three
strikes provisions unconstitutional as applied to actions
concerning certain claims. As discussed above, none of these
courts found that the potential litigant raised a viable civil
rights claim. These courts, however, have yet to address the
constitutionality of the three strikes provision when the
potential litigant does in fact seek to raise a viable civil
rights claim." Thus, these courts might still hold that a
prisoner seeking to bring a civil rights action who alleges
facts that raise a viable constitutional violation would be
seeking to vindicate a fundamental interest such that any
unaffordable filing fee must be waivable. °5
The "as applied" approach to adjudicating the
constitutionality of the three strikes provision is both
practically and theoretically unsound. In practice, this
approach completely fails to further one of the goals of the
three strikes provision, namely conserving judicial
resources. A primary benefit of the three strikes provision is
that it permits courts to deny prisoners in forma pauperis
status without expending judicial resources adjudicating
the merits of underlying cases. However, the "as applied"
202. White, 157 F.3d at 1234.
203. Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1180 (9th Cir. 1999).
204. See Lukens, supra note 2, at 481 (arguing that "the rights at issue in
actions challenging the conditions of a prisoner's confinement clearly are
fundamental").
205. Cf Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 327 n.29 (3d Cir. 2001)
(Mansmann, J., dissenting) (pointing out that the courts in four of the five prior
decisions upholding the three strikes provision found that there were no
fundamental interests at stake), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 2600 (2001). Since the
Fifth Circuit relied solely on the argument that the plaintiff did not seek to
vindicate a fundamental interest in holding that the three strikes provision is
constitutional, see Carson, 112 F.3d at 821, this circuit most clearly still might
find this provision unconstitutional in certain circumstances.
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approach requires courts to examine the merits of each
action or appeal that a prisoner with three strikes seeks to
file to determine whether the case raises a claim
sufficiently fundamental as to require that the filing fee be
waivable. Since courts must examine the specifics of the
claims raised under the "as applied" approach, this
approach 2fails to further the goal of conserving judicial
resources. 06
Perhaps more seriously, the Supreme Court has
indicated in its equal access line of cases that a finding that
an action is frivolous, whether made by counsel or by a
court, is an insufficient basis to deny access for those
categories of cases for which equal access must be provided.
In a pair of transcript equal access cases, the Court held
that a trial judge cannot deny equal access to an
unaffordable trial transcript even if the judge determines
that the direct criminal appeal either would be frivolous or
would not promote justice. °7 Similarly, in the right to
counsel context, even when a defendant's counsel considers
an appeal to be frivolous, the defendant is entitled to have
the counsel follow a prescribed procedure, including filing
an appellate brief demonstrating the lack of merit, to
ensure that the defendant is not deprived of equal access to
appellate counsel. 2°" Furthermore, in no equal access filing
fee case has the Court considered either the specifics of the
claim or the merits of the action in determining whether
equal access to the courts is violated.2 9 Instead, the
Supreme Court's approach in these cases is to consider the
type of claim raised, not the merits of the claim. Thus, the
"as applied" approach, which focuses on the specifics of the
claims, is both inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent
and impractical.

206. In fact, the "as applied" approach might not conserve any judicial
resources, as courts already possess the authority to dispose of frivolous cases
regardless of the applicability of the three strikes provision. See supra note 185
and accompanying text.
207. See Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 496-500 (1963); Eskridge v.
Washington State Bd. of Prison Terms & Parole, 357 U.S. 214, 215-16 (1958)
(per curiam).
208. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 741-42 (1967); see also Pension
v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 79-80 (1988) (holding unconstitutional a state procedure
for the withdrawal of appellate counsel).
209. See cases discussed supra notes 57-69 and accompanying text.
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B. The Availability of State CourtsAs an Alternative
Remedy
The Third and Sixth Circuits have held that the three
strikes provision is constitutional because state courts
continue to remain available fora in which prisoners can
vindicate their civil rights, even though the provision limits
access to federal courts.21 ° These courts based their
decisions on the fact that the Supreme Court has
considered whether a potential litigant has available
alternatives to pursuing a court action in assessing whether
a filing fee for the court action must be waivable." Relying
on the Supreme Court's reasoning, these courts concluded
that, since the three strikes provision leaves a judicial
forum available, namely the state courts, the provision does
not deny access to the courts." However, the Third and
Sixth Circuits' decisions fail to recognize that the
importance of the availability of a federal court forum to
pursue civil actions renders state courts an inadequate
substitute.
In its equal access filing fee decisions, the Supreme
Court, while citing both the availability of alternative
avenues of relief and the nature of the right sought to be
vindicated as factors in determining the constitutionality of
a challenged filing fee, has never stated that the presence of
either factor alone is sufficient to defeat an equal access to
the courts claim. 1 ' In other words, the Court has not settled
the issue of whether equal access can only be denied if both
a fundamental interest is at stake and there is no
alternative available, or whether a finding that a
fundamental interest is at stake is sufficient to find that
equal access is denied, regardless of whether an alternative
remedy is available. Thus, it is an open question whether,
once it is determined that a potential litigant seeks to
vindicate a fundamental interest, the constitutionality of

210. See Abdul-Akbar, 239 F.3d at 318; Wilson v. Yaklich, 148 F.3d 596, 605
(6th Cir. 1998); cf. Lukens, supra note 3, at 511 (stating that the availability of
state courts as an alternative remedy is the strongest argument in favor of the
constitutionality of the three strikes provision).
211. See Abdul-Akbar, 239 F.3d at 317-18; Wilson, 148 F.3d at 605; supra
note 66 and accompanying text.
212. See Abdul-Akbar, 239 F.3d at 318; Wilson, 148 F.3d at 605.
213. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
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the three strikes provision is at all affected by the
availability of alternative fora."'
Furthermore, the three strikes provision is
distinguishable from the restrictions challenged in the
Supreme Court cases relied on by the Third and Sixth
Circuits because of the difference in the type of alternative
remedies that are available. In United States v. Kras,215 the
Court relied on the fact that debtors have alternatives to
filing bankruptcy actions in court, namely private
negotiations with creditors, to find that the challenged fee
was constitutional.216 In Ortwein v. Schwab,217 the Court

relied on the fact that those challenging adverse welfare
decisions are entitled to evidentiary hearings required by
due process as an alternative procedure in finding the
challenged fee constitutional. 18 The Supreme Court did not
state that a judicial forum was an alternative remedy in
either of the cases. In fact, the Supreme Court in Smith v.
Bennett. 9 found that Iowa's habeas corpus filing fee on
actions filed in state court violated equal protection, despite
the fact that Iowa had explicitly argued that the fee was
constitutional because the federal courts were available to
adjudicate habeas corpus petitions.22 ° Given the fact that, as
214. See Anderson, supra note 64, at 473-74 (arguing that, in the appellate
context, the Court might not require that there be no alternative forum when
the interest at stake is strong enough to require equal access).
A similar point could be raised in discussing the argument that the three
strikes provision is constitutional when a potential litigant seeks to vindicate a
non-fundamental interest, namely that the Supreme Court has not ruled out
the possibility that an unaffordable filing fee could be found unconstitutional
even absent the litigant's seeking to vindicate a fundamental interest. However,
both points cannot be valid, because, under Supreme Court precedent, when a
fundamental interest is not present and alternative remedies are available, it is
clear that non-waivable filing fees may constitutionally be imposed. See supra
note 68 and accompanying text.
215. 409 U.S. 434 (1972).
216. Id. at 445-46.
217. 410 U.S. 656 (1973) (per curiam)
218. Id. at 659-60.
219. 365 U.S. 708 (1961).
220. According to the Court, Iowa argued that one reason that its fee was
constitutional was that "a habeas corpus action may be brought in the United
States District Court." Id. at 711. In response, the Court wrote the following:
The Attorney General of Iowa also argues that indigent prisoner in the
State's custody may seek "vindication of federal rights alleged to have
been denied by the State" in the federal courts. But even though this be
true-an additional point not involved or passed upon here-it would
ill-behoove this great State, whose devotion to equality of rights is

20011

THREE STRIKES

1147

discussed above, the Supreme Court in Wolff found civil
rights actions to be as fundamental as habeas corpus
petitions in the access to the courts context,' there is no
reason to think that the availability of an alternative
judicial forum would be adequate to find the denial of
access to federal courts to be constitutional. Thus, not only
has the Supreme Court not decided whether the availability
of an alternative avenue of relief is sufficient to overcome
an equal access challenge, it has also held that a filing fee
violated equal access when an alternative judicial forum
was available.
Finally, even if the availability of alternative judicial
fora could in general defeat an equal access claim, a state
court civil rights case is not an adequate alternative to a
case in federal court for the vindication of civil rights
violations. The Civil Rights Act of 1871, which included the
statutory mechanism for enforcing civil rights against state
officials, was specifically enacted to provide federal court
jurisdiction for violations of federal constitutional rights
because leaving these rights to be vindicated through state
courts was viewed as inadequate. 222 Thus, the Civil Rights

indelibly stamped upon its history, to say to its indigent prisoners
seeking redress what they believe to be the State's wrongs: "Go to the
federal Court." Moreover, the state remedy may offer review of
questions not involving federal rights and therefore not raisable in
federal habeas corpus.
Id. at 713. The Court is making two arguments here, namely that a sovereign
should not deny equal access to its courts on the basis that the courts of another
sovereign may be open, and that certain claims may not be available in the
alternative courts. The first argument is more pertinent to the issue of the
constitutionality of the three strikes provision, as finding the provision
constitutional would be equivalent to the federal government saying to indigent
prisoners who seek to redress federal civil rights violations in federal court:
"[Go to the [state] courts." See Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 329 (3d
Cir.) (Mansmann, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 2600 (2001).
221. See supranotes 172-74 and accompanying text.
222. See, e.g., Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 279 (1985) ("Congress
therefore intended that the remedy provided in § 1983 be independently
enforceable whether or not it duplicates a parallel state remedy."); Patsy v. Bd.
of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 503-05 (1982); Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242
(1972) (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1879)) ("The very purpose
of § 1983 was to interpose the federal courts between the States and the people,
as guardians of the people's federal rights-to protect the people from
unconstitutional action under color of state law, 'Whether that action be
executive, legislative or judicial.'"); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961)
('The federal remedy [§ 1983] is supplementary to the state remedy, and the
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Act placed a primacy on federal court adjudication over
state court adjudication of civil rights violations. Federal
court availability might be especially important for
prisoners, as state courts are potentially hostile to prisoner
civil rights cases such that they might not fully enforce
federal rights.2" In light of the clear intent behind § 1983 to
make a federal forum available, the nature of civil rights
cases precludes finding a state judicial forum to be an
adequate alternative remedy.
C. Whether Plaintiffs Suffer an Actual Injury
The Tenth Circuit, in upholding the constitutionality of
the three strikes provision, has held that the prisoner
challenging this provision lacked standing to bring suit
since he failed to allege an actual injury.2 24 The court based
Casey,225
its decision on the Supreme Court case of Lewis v.
in which the Court held that prisoners claiming a denial of
the right of access to the courts must demonstrate that the
challenged state action caused an actual injury by
frustrating a non-frivolous claim.226 While the Tenth Circuit
correctly cited Lewis for the proposition that a litigant must
suffer an actual injury to have standing, the court
incorrectly concluded that the three strikes provision does
not cause an actual injury when it imposes an unaffordable
filing fee on potential litigants completely preventing them
from filing civil rights cases.
The Supreme Court in Lewis reversed a Ninth Circuit
decision that had affirmed, for the most part, a district
court injunction concerning the provision of legal services to
Arizona prisoners.2 7 While the Court found fault with the
decisions below on a number of grounds, the relevant
reason for reversing the decision was that the lower courts
latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked.");
Franklin, supra note 13, at 208-10; Lukens, supra note 2, at 511-12.
223. See Lukens, supra note 2, at 512-13 (arguing that a number of factors
contribute to the potential for prisoners' rights to receive less protection in state
courts than in federal courts). If states actually foreclose access to their courts
to indigent prisoner by imposing unaffordable, unwaivable filing fees, then the
state court remedies would no longer be available, let alone adequate.
224. See White v. Colorado, 157 F.3d 1226, 1233-34 (10th Cir. 1998), cert.
denied, 526 U.S. 1008 (1999).
225. 518 U.S. 343 (1996).
226. Id. at 349-55.
227. See id. at 346-48, 364.
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failed to require plaintiffs to demonstrate that they had
suffered an actual injury.228 In particular, the Court held
that, in order to satisfy the actual injury standing
requirement, the plaintiffs had to demonstrate that the lack
of legal services frustrated their legal claims, and that these
frustrated claims were not frivolous. 29 The Court reasoned
that the right of access to the courts did not establish a
freestanding right to legal services, but instead that access
need only be provided to pursue otherwise fundamental
claims, and that a prisoner is not harmed by being
prevented from pursuing frivolous claims.230
The
Lewis
decision
does
not
support
the
constitutionality of the three strikes provision because the

228. The Court also held that the instances of actual injury suffered by the
plaintiffs failed to support the scope and detail of the injunction, certain delays
in receiving legal materials and assistance did not violate the right of access to
the courts, and the process that generated the injunction was improper. See id.
at 357-63.
229. See id. at 348-60. Alternatively, the Court described the actual injury
requirement as requiring that the frustrated claims allege an "arguably
actionable harm." Id. at 351.
Four Justices-Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens-dissented on the
issue of whether the plaintiffs suffered an actual injury. Justice Souter, in an
opinion joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, concluded that, to demonstrate
an actual injury, a prisoner simply should "have some concrete grievance or
gripe about the conditions of his confinement, the validity of his conviction, or
perhaps some other problem for which he would seek legal redress." Id. at 399
(Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Souter provided
three reasons for this lower standard:
First, it is the existence of an underlying grievance, not its ultimate
legal merit, that gives a prisoner a concrete interest in the litigation
and will thus assure the serious and adversarial treatment of the
Bounds claim. Second, Bounds recognized a right of access for those
who seek adjudication, not for sure winners or likely winners or
possible winners. Finally, instances of a "nonfrivolous claim" rather
than a "concrete grievance" as a standing requirement will do no more
than guarantee a lot of preliminary litigation over nothing.
Id. at 399-400 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Stevens concluded that the restrictions themselves, by burdening the right of
access to the courts, create the injury in fact, regardless of the merits of the
claim. See id. at 408-09 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
For discussions on the actual injury aspect of the Lewis decision on prisoner
litigation, see generally Susan N. Herman, Slashing and Burning Prisoners'
Rights: Congress and the Supreme Court in Dialogue, 77 OR. L. REv. 1229,
1261-66 (1998); Steinberger, supra note 39; Amy E. Webbink, Access Denied:
IncarceratedJuveniles and Their Right ofAccess to Courts, 7 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 613 (1999).
230. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349-53 & n.3. (1996)
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effects of the allegedly inadequate law libraries and legal
assistance programs challenged in Lewis are clearly
distinguishable from the effects of the three strikes
provision. The plaintiffs in Lewis had an opportunity to file
an action, albeit made more difficult by the inadequacies of
the law library. The three strikes provision goes much
further than inadequate law libraries and legal assistance
programs by completely denying prisoners access to the
courts. Such a complete denial of access is qualitatively
different from simply failing to provide the tools that might
assist prisoners in formulating their claims and filing a case
in court. The reason that these situations are
distinguishable is that the Lewis decision concerns the right
of access to the courts, while the three strikes provision
concerns the right of equal access.23 ' The challenge in Lewis
was to the failure to provide "the means for ensuring a
reasonably adequate opportunity to present claimed
violations of fundamental constitutional rights to the
courts, " 22 not to state action that completely prevents the
presentation of a claim in court. As in Smith, "the operation
of the statutes under attack has, perhaps inadvertently,
made [the court remedy] available only to those persons
who can pay the necessary filing fees."2 3 Thus, by
completely foreclosing access to the courts, the three strikes
provision causes an actual injury.23
Even if the Lewis decision is read as requiring that a
litigant raise a non-frivolous claim in order to have
standing to challenge the three strikes provision, prisoners
still would have standing to challenge the three strikes
provision under certain circumstances, namely when
seeking to raise non-frivolous claims. Thus, even under the
Tenth Circuit's reading, the Court's decision in Lewis does
not completely insulate the three strikes provision from
constitutional challenge. In this respect, this argument for
the constitutionality of the three strikes provision suffers
231. Justice Thomas's concurrence in Lewis, in fact, distinguishes the equal
access to the courts from access to the courts. See id. at 373 (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (distinguishing the equal protection principles of the transcript and
fee cases from the access to the court cases' requirement that the state finance
access to the courts).
232. Id. at 351 (citations omitted).
233. Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 713 (1961).
234. See Justice Stevens's dissent in Lewis, discussed in supra note 229; see
also Franklin, supranote 13, at 213.
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from the same weakness as the argument that a claim does
not raise a fundamental interest, namely that neither
precludes all challenges to the three strikes provision.
Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit's reading of the actual
injury
requirement
would
make
assessing
the
constitutionality of the three strikes provision an "as
applied" approach.235 This reading implicates the same
objections as applicable to the approach that limits
constitutional challenges to the three strikes provision to
circumstances in which a potential litigant seeks to
vindicate a fundamental interest. Like the fundamental
interest concern, the actual injury "as applied" approach is
problematic because a court reviewing a challenge to the
three strikes provision would have to consider the nature of
the claim raised before deciding whether the provision was
unconstitutional, undermining the resource-preserving
goals of the three strikes provision." Thus, even under the
Tenth Circuit's interpretation of Lewis, there is scant
advantage to enforcing an actual injury requirement.
Furthermore, as noted above, there is no precedent in the
Court's equal access to the courts cases for distinguishing
between frivolous and non-frivolous claims. 3 '
D. In FormaPauperisAs Only a Statutory Right
Four of the circuit courts upholding the three strikes
provision-the Third, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh-have
supported their holdings by citing the proposition that in
forma pauperis is a statutorily defined privilege, not a
fundamental right,23 implying that this privilege can be
constitutionally modified by statute. However, not only is
this argument not well supported, but the decisions that
235. As Justice Souter noted in the Lewis decision, under this approach "a
district court may be required to examine the merits of each plaintiffs
underlying claim in order to determine whether he has standing to litigate a
Bounds [access to the courts] claim." 518 U.S. at 399 (Souter, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
236. See supra note 206 and accompanying text; see also supra note 229
(quoting Justice Souter in Lewis).
237. See cases discussed supra Part I.A.2.
238. See Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 316-17 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 121 S. Ct. 2600 (2001); Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1180 (9th Cir.
1998); White v. Colorado, 157 F.3d 1226, 1233 (10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526
U.S. 1008 (1999); Rivera v. AIin, 144 F.3d 719, 723 (11th Cir. 1998); see also
Sturtz, supra note 13, at 1360.
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rely on this argument fail to recognize that the challenge to
the three strikes provision is a constitutionalchallenge. As
such, the fact that there is an in forma pauperis statute is
irrelevant to the question of whether a filing fee to bring a
civil rights action in federal court must be waivable.
The argument that, since proceeding in forma pauperis
is a statutory privilege, this privilege can be modified by
statute is not well supported. The Third and Ninth Circuits
cited no authority supporting this argument," 9 while the
sole source for this argument relied on by the Tenth and
Eleventh Circuits is the Fifth Circuit's decision in Adepegba
v. Hammons.24 ° In Adepegba, the Fifth Circuit held that the
three strikes provision a plies to actions filed prior to the
enactment of the PLRA.' In so doing, the court noted that
it has recognized that there is no right to pursue appeals in
forma pauperis." However, the court made this statement
while addressing the issue of whether the three strikes
provision is procedural,24 not the separate issue of whether
the provision violates the right of equal access to the courts.
In answering the procedural question, the court found that
the three strikes provision did not impair a party's right,
increase a party's liability, or impose new duties on a
party, 4 which are the criteria under Supreme Court
precedent for determining whether a newly enacted
statutory provision is procedural, and thus applicable at the
time of its enactment.245 While a filing fee may be
procedural, with its imposition not adversely affecting any
substantive rights for retroactivity purposes, its imposition
nonetheless can violate the right of equal access to the
courts. 46 Thus, that the Fifth Circuit held the three strikes
239. See Abdul-Akbar, 239 F.3d at 316 n.2; Rodriguez, 169 F.3d at 1180.
240. See Rivera, 144 F.3d at 724 (citing Adepegba v. Hammons, 103 F.3d
383, 386 (5th Cir. 1996)); Rodriguez, 169 F.3d at 1180 (citing Rivera); White,
157 F.3d at 1233 (citing Rivera).
241. 103 F.3d at 385-87.
242. Id. at 386 (citing Startti v. United States, 415 F.2d 1115, 1116 (5th Cir.
1969) (per curiam), in which the Fifth Circuit, without any analysis or citation,
stated that "[there is no absolute right to be allowed to proceed in forma
pauperis in civil matters" as "it is a privilege").
243. See id. ("Section 1915 is a procedural statute governing the process by
which indigent individuals, including prisoners, bring civil actions or appeals in
the federal courts.").
244. See id. at 386-87.
245. See Landgrafv. USI Film Prod., 511 U.S. 244, 269 (1994).
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provision to be procedural for retroactivity purposes does
not control whether it violates the right to equal access to
the courts.24 '
While it is certainly true that the ability to proceed in
forma pauperisin federal courts is governed by statute, this
does not mean either that the in forma pauperis statute
cannot be amended in an unconstitutional manner 248 or,
more importantly for this discussion, that the statute
provides the only basis for a fee waiver. The most obvious
example of this latter point is the Supreme Court's equal
access to the courts case of Smith v. Bennett.249 The Court in
Smith held that prisoners have a constitutional right to file
a habeas corpus petition without payment of an
unaffordable filing fee, regardless of the fact that the state's
statute governing habeas corpus filing fees did not allow for
such a waiver. In fact, the filing fee equal access to the
courts cases all precisely concern situations in which
statutory law does not provide for the waiver of an
unaffordable filing fee. Thus, the fact that a statute
precludes certain litigants from proceeding in forma
pauperis simply does not affect the constitutionality of the
three strikes provision.25 '

246. An obvious example of a procedural rule that violates equal protection
would be one that only applies to litigants of a specific race or ethnicity.
247. A number of other circuit courts also found that the three strikes
provision is procedural for retroactivity purposes in holding that dismissals
prior to the enactment of the PLRA count as strikes. See supra note 15 and
accompanying text.
248. Using a similar example as the one discussed above, see supranote 246
an amendment of the in forma pauperis statute providing that only litigants of
a certain race or ethnicity could take advantage of the statute clearly would
render the statute unconstitutional, regardless of whether the ability to proceed
in forma pauperisis a privilege.
249. 365 U.S. 708 (1961).
250. See supranote 167 and accompanying text. Importantly, the defendant
in Smith unsuccessfully raised a similar argument, namely that it could
statutorily define access to the courts to pursue habeascorpus petitions. See 365
U.S. at 711 ("The State insists that it may [impose the filing fee] for three
reasons.... Second, habeas corpus is a statutory right... and the legislature
may constitutionally extend or limit its application.").
251. See Eisenberg, supra note 29, at 423-24 (arguing that the Supreme
Court has abandoned the distinction between rights and privileges, such that
the withdrawal of a privilege is subject to constitutional scrutiny); Lukens,
supra note 2, at 482.
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E. The Imminent DangerException As a Sufficient
Safeguard
Although not directly relying on this argument, the
Eighth
and
Tenth
Circuits,
in
upholding
the
constitutionality of the three strikes provision, noted that
the provision allows a prisoner otherwise subject to the
three strikes provision to bring an action in forma pauperis
if "the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious
physical injury."252 This reference implicates the argument
that the imminent danger of serious physical injury
exception preserves the constitutionality of the three
strikes provision by providing a safeguard for those who
truly need to file civil rights cases."'
While the imminent danger exception does allow some
indigent prisoners with three strikes to have access to the
courts, this exception is too limited to allow the three
strikes provision to survive a constitutional challenge." 4
There is no authority in the equal access to the courts cases
for limiting the cases that can be brought. This is so
specifically for civil rights cases, where the Supreme Court
in Wolff v. McDonnell,25 when discussing the fundamental
nature of civil rights actions, provided no indication that
certain types of civil rights actions have priority over other
types. Thus, there is no basis for relying on the imminent
danger exception to find the three strikes provision
constitutional.

252. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (cited by Higgins v. Carpenter, 258 F.3d 797 (8th
Cir. 2001) and White v. Colorado, 157 F.3d 1226, 1235 (10th Cir. 1998), cert.
denied, 526 U.S. 1008 (1999)).
253. So far only two circuit courts have held that a prisoner's allegations fell
within the imminent danger of serious physical injury exception to the three
strikes provision. See Gibbs v. Cross, 160 F.3d 962, 965-67 (3d Cir. 1998)
(holding that allegations that dust and lint particles caused severe headaches,
mucus, and other ailments constituted allegations of an imminent danger of
serious physical injury); Ashley v. Dilworth, 147 F.3d 715 (8th Cir. 1998) (per
curiam) (holding that allegations on ongoing danger after prison officials placed
the plaintiff near his enemies constituted allegations of an imminent danger of
serious physical injury).
254. See Lukens, supra note 2, at 497 (stating that the standard for taking
advantage of the imminent danger exception is very difficult to meet).
255. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
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F. The Availability of Administrative ProceedingsAs an
Alternative Remedy
One argument for finding the three strikes provision
constitutional that the circuit courts considering the issue
have not addressed is whether the availability of prison
administrative remedies means that the provision does not
deny equal access to the courts. As noted above, the
Supreme Court has identified whether a litigant has an
alternative to the court action as a factor in determining
whether an unaffordable filing fee denies a potential
litigant the right of equal access to the courts.256 In fact, the
Supreme Court in Ortwein v. Schwab specifically identified
the administrative remedy available as a reason for finding
the unaffordable appellate filing fee constitutional.2
However, prison administrative remedies are not the type
of alternative remedy that would make the three strikes
provision constitutional.
Many prisons have an administrative grievance system
that prisoners can take advantage of. Furthermore, the
PLRA strengthened the requirement that prisoners
bringing conditions of confinement civil rights actions in
federal court must first exhaust available administrative
remedies." 8 Thus, it could be argued that the availability of
such administrative remedies is sufficient to uphold the
constitutionality of the three strikes provision.
Initially, as with the argument that state court
remedies provide an adequate alternative, it is unclear
whether the availability of an alternative remedy defeats
an equal access claim when a fundamental interest is at
stake.259 In addition, none of the prisoner access cases have

256. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
257. See Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 659-60 (1973) (per curiam).
258. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (Supp. 1999) ("No action shall be brought with
respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal
law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until
such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.").
259. The Court in Ortwein appeared to emphasize the fact that the
alternative process, namely the evidentiary hearing, was a due process
requirement in finding that due process was not violated by an unaffordable fee
on the appeal. See 410 U.S. at 659-60. However, since this article argues that
the three strikes provision violates equal protection, it is less relevant that
prisoners might have procedural due process through prison administrative
proceedings. While the Court in Ortwein did consider an equal protection

1156

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

found that the availability of prison administrative
remedies undermines the access claim. In cases such as
Bounds, Wolff, and Avery, the Court held that the
challenged state action violated the right of access to the
260
courts without discussing
the availability of prison
administrative remedies.
Furthermore, like the state court remedies, the
administrative remedies available to prisoners are not an61
adequate substitute for a civil rights case in federal court.
In particular, prison administrative remedies generally do
not authorize compensatory damages as a remedy. It was in
recognition of this that the Supreme Court in McCarthy v.
Madigan62 held that federal prisoners who seek only
monetary damages need not exhaust the available prison
administrative remedies to pursue a Bivens claim. 63
Similarly, several circuit courts have held that state
prisoners need not exhaust their prison remedies to pursue
claims solely for monetary damages, even after the PLRA's
strengthening
of
the
administrative
exhaustion
requirement. 6 At least one circuit court has held that the
PLRA's exhaustion requirement does not even apply to
certain non-conditions of confinement civil rights claims.26
Given that prison administrative procedures do not
authorize the full remedies for civil rights violations
available in federal court, they are an inadequate substitute
to a federal court action.

challenge, it does not consider the challenge in terms of the right of access to
the courts. See id. at 660.
260. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977); Wolff, 418 U.S. 539; Johnson
v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
261. Since a prison administrative remedy is even less likely than a state
court forum to protect a prisoner's constitutional rights, and civil rights cases in
federal court are meant to provide an alternative forum to inadequate state
courts, it follows that the availability of administrative remedies should not
undermine the available of a federal court forum.
262. 503 U.S. 140 (1992).
263. Id. at 148.
264. See Rumbles v. Hill, 182 F.3d 1064, 1068 (9th Cir. 1999); Garrett v.
Hawk, 127 F.3d 1263, 1266-67 (10th Cir. 1997); Whitley v. Hunt, 158 F.3d 882,
886-87 (5th Cir. 1998). But see Perez v. Dep't of Corr., 182 F.3d 532, 537 (7th
Cir. 1999); Alexander v. Hawk, 159 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 1998).
265. See Nussle v. Willette, 224 F.3d 95, 97-99 (2d Cir. 2000).
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G. Three Strikes As a Statutory Reflection of Current Court
Authority
Another argument for the constitutionality of the three
strikes provision that has not been discussed by the circuit
courts addressing the issue is that this provision is simply a
statutory codification of the established authority that
federal courts possess to sanction abusive litigants. 6 This
argument is based on the fact that federal courts have held
that they have the inherent authority to sanction abusive
litigants by curtailing their access to the courts, including
limiting the availability of proceeding in forma pauperis.
However, since, as discussed below, the three strikes
provision is substantially different from established court
authority, the inherent authority to sanction abusive
litigants does not justify the three strikes provision.
A federal court's inherent power to sanction abusive
is well
litigants by imposing filing restrictions
established.2 7 Courts have imposed a variety of types of
restrictions on such litigants, including limiting a litigant's
ability to take advantage of the in forma pauperis statute.
This article does not discuss the full range of such
restrictions, as this is done elsewhere. 68 However, there are
266. See Lukens, supra note 2, at 482-83; Sturtz, supra note 13, at 1373.
The Fifth Circuit did use this reasoning as part of its decision that the three
strikes provision applies to cases pending when the PLRA was enacted. See
Adepegba v. Hammons, 103 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 1996) ("The 'three strikes'
provision merely codifies an existing practice in the courts designed to prevent
prisoners from abusing the i.f.p. privilege."). The Ninth and Eleventh Circuits
have cited the court's authority to restrict filings in their decisions finding the
three strikes provision constitutional without relying on this as an argument in
support of their decisions. See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1179 (9th Cir.
1999) (noting that "the Supreme Court has at times prospectively denied IFP
status to prisoners filing for writs of certiorari because those prisoners had filed
numerous frivolous writs"); Rivera v. Allin, 144 F.3d 719, 724 n.7 (11th Cir.
1998) (noting that "[tihis circuit has upheld pre-filing screening restrictions on
litigious plaintiffs").
267. See, e.g., Werner v. Utah, 32 F.3d 1446, 1447-48 (10th Cir. 1994) (per
curiam); De Long v. Hennessey, 912 F.2d 1144, 1147-48 (9th Cir. 1990); Safir v.
United States Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 19, 25-26 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1099 (1987); see also Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991)
(discussing the authority for, and scope of, the inherent powers of courts); In re
McDonald, 489 U.S. 180 (1989) (per curiam) (prohibiting the petitioner from
filing any additional extraordinary writs in forma pauperis).
268. See Lukens, supra note 2, at 482-89 (detailing court sanctions against
abusive litigants); DeWolf, supra note 13, at 264-69 (discussing judicial efforts
to limit abusive litigation); Jeffrey R. Maahs & Rolando V. Del Carmen,
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a number of key ways in which the three strikes provision
differs from the courts' inherent power to sanction.
First, the types of cases that the three strikes provision
counts as strikes are broader than the types of cases that
courts have relied on to justify sanctioning litigants. The
three strikes provision counts cases as strikes if "dismissed
on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted."269 In
contrast, courts sanction litigants who are "vexatious" or
"abusive,"270 suggesting that actions or appeals that merely
are legally frivolous or fail to state a claim do not rise to the
level of dismissals warranting filing restrictions. 7 1 This
distinction is especially relevant considering that pro se
prisoners not only might not know whether their injuries
are legally cognizable and thus might seek relief for harms
that are not cognizable, but also often lack the legal ability
to file well-pleaded complaints even when they have
suffered a legally cognizable injury.7 2 In light of the
Curtailing Frivolous Section 1983 Inmate Litigation: Laws, Practices, and
Proposals, 59 FED. PROBATION 53, 54-55 (1995) (discussing the methods used by
judges to curtail abusive litigants).
269. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (Supp. 1999).
270. See, e.g., In re Martin-Trigona, 9 F.3d 226, 228-29 (2d Cir. 1993); De
Long, 912 F.2d at 1148 (stating that mere lack of jurisdiction does not
constitute frivolousness); cf Richardson Greenshields Sec., Inc. v. Lau, 825 F.2d
647 (2d Cir. 1987) ("Absent extraordinary circumstances, such as a
demonstrated history of frivolous and vexatious litigation.., a court has no
power to prevent a party from filing pleadings, motions or appeals authorized
by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.") (emphasis added).
271. Congress itself recognized the difference between merely frivolous suits
and malicious, harassing, and fraudulent suits when it authorized the
revocation of earned good time credits in the PLRA. See Prison Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 § 809, 28 U.S.C. § 1932 (Supp. IV 1999):
In any civil action brought by an adult convicted of a crime and
confined in a Federal correctional facility, the court may order the
revocation of such earned good time credit under section 3624(b) of title
18, United States Code, that has not yet vested, if, on its own motion or
the motion of any party, the court finds that(1) the claim was filed for a malicious purpose;
(2) the claim was filed solely to harass the party against which it was
filed; or
(3) the claimant testifies falsely or otherwise knowingly presents false
evidence or information to the court.
Id. In addition, dismissals for failure to state a claim are not necessarily
frivolous. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 331 (1989); DeWolf, supra note
13, at 260; Riewe, supra note 3, at 147 n.154.
272. See, e.g., Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 825-26 & n.14 (1977);
Eisenberg, supra note 29, at 437-45 (arguing that prisoners often bring suit
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barriers that such prisoners face in filing a proper claim, a
dismissal for failure to state a claim, or even as frivolous,
may not warrant a sanction against the prisoner." '
Second, in contrast to the three strikes provision, courts
exercise discretion in determining the number of dismissed
cases that will trigger sanctions."' The three strikes
provision, however, as is obvious from its name, ties its
sanction to a specific number of strikes. Courts have not
linked sanctions to the disposition of a specific number of
cases.
Third, a number of courts have held that, when filing
restrictions are imposed, they must be narrowly tailored to
the abuse triggering the sanction."5 For example, courts
often restrict litigants from filing only specific types of
cases, based on the nature of the litigant's abuse." '
Conversely, some courts have held that a complete
revocation of in forma pauperis violates the right of access
to the courts." ' At least one commentator has found such a
after having suffered injury even if not legally cognizable and that prisoners'
lack of legal ability contributes to their complaints being found frivolous);
Lukens, supranote 2, at 495-96; Riewe, supranote 3, at 147 n.154.
273. A pattern of legally frivolous actions may demonstrate that a litigant is
being abusive or vexatious. See, e.g., Lysiak v. Comm'r, 816 F.2d 311, 312-13
(7th Cir. 1987) (per curiam). However, simply filing numerous actions is an
insufficient basis to support a filing sanction.
274. See, e.g., Mendoza v. Lynaugh, 989 F.2d 191, 195 (5th Cir. 1993)
(noting that district court sanctions against abusive litigants are reviewed for
an abuse of discretion); see also Lukens, supra note 2, at 483 & n.89 (stating
that courts have ensured that those it sanctions are "truly flagrant abuser[s]"
before imposing filing restrictions and citing cases); Riewe, supra note 3, at 149
(noting that the three strikes provision eliminates a court's discretion in
determining whether a litigant is abusive).
275. See, e.g., Bd. of Managers of 2900 Ocean Ave. Condo. v. Bronkovic, 83
F.3d 44, 45 (2d Cir. 1996) (per curiam); Cok v. Fain. Ct. of R.I., 985 F.2d 32, 34
(1st Cir. 1993) (per curiam); De Long v. Hennessey, 912 F.2d 1144, 1148 (9th
Cir. 1990); Cotner v. Hopkins, 795 F.2d 900, 902 (10th Cir. 1986) (per curiam).
276. See DeWolf, supra note 13, at 264; Lukens, supra note 2, at 483 & n.90
(citing cases).
277. See Carter v. United States, 733 F.2d 735, 737 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding
that sanctioning a litigant by completely prohibiting him from filing any actions
in forma pauperis "violates 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) and unduly impairs appellant's
constitutional right of access to the courts"), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1161 (1985);
see also Cotner, 795 F.2d at 903. But cf. In re Sindram, 498 U.S. 177, 180 (1991)
(denying the litigant in forma pauperis status for all subsequent petitions for
extraordinary relief); In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180 (1989) (per curiam) (same).
While the Supreme Court appears to have denied all access to proceeding in
forma pauperis before it as to certain types of cases, these decisions do not
directly affect the constitutionality of the three strikes provision because access
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revocation questionable as well.278 The three strikes
provision, by contrast, places a blanket prohibition on a
prisoner from filing any type of action. Thus, the scope of
the three strikes provision is broader than the established
court authority to sanction abusive litigants.79 In
particular, courts can choose from a range of sanctions and
impose an appropriate sanction."' Thus, the three strikes
provision represents a substantial departure from the
established authority of courts to sanction abusive litigants
and cannot
281 be justified as a statutory codification of this
authority.

Finally, even if the restrictions imposed by the three
strikes provision were sufficiently similar to traditional
judicial sanctions to be justified as a sanction, the
restrictions still are discriminatory. The three strikes
provision applies only to in forma pauperis filings, not to
filings in general. That it denies access to the court just to
to afford the filing fees raises equal
those who are unable
2 2
access concerns.

8

CONCLUSION

The circuit court decisions upholding the three strikes
provision against constitutional challenge reflect continuing
to the Supreme Court is not available as a right, and the extraordinary relief
precluded by its orders is not a part of the ordinary course of litigation.
278. See DeWolf, supranote 13, at 267 ("Courts have held, however, that the
legitimacy of a total ban on all in forma pauperis filings by a particular litigant
as a sanction for abusive filings is questionable.") (footnote omitted).
279. In Boddie v. Connecticut,the Supreme Court anticipated and dismissed
some of the arguments supporting the three strikes provision: "Moreover, other
alternatives exist to fee and cost requirements as a means for conserving the
time of courts and protecting parties from frivolous litigation, such as penalties
for false pleadings or affidavits, and actions for malicious prosecution or abuse
of process, to mention only a few." 401 U.S. 371, 381-82 (1971). Furthermore, as
noted above, the PLRA authorizes courts to revoke federal prisoners' good time
credit as a sanction for filing malicious or harassing claims or presenting false
evidence or information to the court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1932 (Supp. IV 1999).
280. See Schonenberger, supra note 13, at 471-72.
281. See Lukens, supra note 2, at 504 (arguing that the three strikes
provision "codified an injunction more restrictive than the most extreme
injunction ever entered by a federal court").
282. Denying all access to the courts, while avoiding implicating equal
protection, would raise due process, access to the courts concerns. That such
would be the case further demonstrates why denying access to the courts only to
those who cannot afford such access is constitutionally suspect.
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misconceptions concerning the equal access to the courts
cases specifically and substantive equal protection
generally. These decisions disregard the practical effects of
not allowing the waiver of naffordable court fees. For
example, in upholding the three strikes provision the Fifth
Circuit stated, without any acknowledgment of the practical
consequences, that "[slection 1915(g) does not prevent a
prisoner with three strikes from filing civil actions."283 The
Eleventh Circuit quoted this exact sentence in its decision,
again without any acknowledgment of the practical effects
of the lack of waiver.' In fact, these decisions raise the
specter of a class of prisoners-those with three strikes and
insufficient funds to file a case-being completely precluded
from bringing civil rights cases in federal court, a
circumstance that might not escape the prison officials in
charge of the prisoners' conditions of confinement.
In contrast to the circuit court decisions reviewed in
this article, the Supreme Court in its equal access cases has
specifically recognized that the imposition of an
unaffordable filing fee does prevent litigants from having
access to the courts. Hopefully, those circuit courts yet to
adjudicate the issue will not simply follow suit of those that
have, but instead will give greater weight to arguments
against constitutionality. In this regard, it is encouraging
that four judges dissented from the Third Circuit's
upholding of the constitutionality of the three strikes
provision." Finally, if this issue goes before the Supreme
Court, the Court should follow the spirit of, and the
reasoning in, its established equal access to the court
precedent
and find the three strikes
provision
unconstitutional.

283. Carson v. Johnson, 112 F.3d 818, 821 (5th Cir.1997).
284. See Rivera v. Allin, 144 F.3d 719, 723 (11th Cir. 1998); see also AbdulAkbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 317 (3d Cir. 2001) ("Section 1915(g) does not
prevent a prisoner with 'three strikes' from filing a civil action.. .. "), cert.
denied, 121 S. Ct. 2600 (2001).
285. See Abdul-Akbar, 239 F.3d at 319 (Mansmann, J., joined by Sloviter,
Nygaard, and McKee, JJ., dissenting).

